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“The islands situated between Sind and Oman in the Persian Sea
belong to Persia, the largest of which are Qis and Bahrain.”1
– Hamdallah Mustawfi
   Geographer
   1329 
    
Introduction
 The abandonment of the Iranian claim to Bahrain is seemingly a benign moment in 
Iranian history, and those analyzing modern Iran tend to focus on pivotal moments such as the 
early parliamentary revolution (1905), the Shah’s White Revolution (1963), the Islamic 
Revolution (1979), the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), or the current dialogue surrounding Iran’s 
nuclear capabilities. Contemporary scholars of Iran more often than not attempt to construct 
accurate accounts of these historical developments. As a result, smaller moments are often 
overlooked to illustrate broader developments affecting Iran, and the greater Middle East. 
Employing a lens that focuses on one event allows for detailed insight into the intricacies that 
may be missed in an analysis with a wider scope. Through examining the deliberations over the 
fate of the Iranian state’s claim to Bahrain between 1968 and 1970 and subsequent territorial 
disputes one gains a comprehensive understanding of monarchial concerns, constraints, and 
transforming regional dynamics.
 The belief that Bahrain is part of Persia is an outlook expressed in centuries predating the 
the reign of the last Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (r. 1941 - 1979).2 During his rule the 
1
1 Hooshang Amirahmadi, Small Islands, Big Politics: The Tonbs and Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf  (New York: St. 
Martin’s, 1996), 36.
2 In 1935 Reza Shah Pahlavi (r. 1925 - 1941) declared that Persia should be referred to in diplomatic correspondence 
with foreign states as Iran. To reflect this, the name Persia will be used prior to 1935, and Iran following.
Shah would seemingly quite willingly dispose of all formal links between the two territories. 
How was he able to achieve such an outcome? Before investigating the process that brought 
about this result and ensuing changes in sovereignty in the Persian Gulf it is necessary to have a 
comprehensive understanding of the dual Iranian and British assertion of jurisdiction in Bahrain. 
Prior to the latter’s disengagement from the region and negotiations which garnered the cessation 
of the Iranian claim, both states viewed themselves as having legal right to the territory.
Pre-1968 Bahrain: Persia Proper
 The Iranian claim that Bahrain is part of Persia proper cites early scholarly and artistic 
work as proof of authority. The Persian geographer and poet Hamdallah Mustawfi is but one 
example for in the early 14th century he was conveying an attitude of Iranian possession 
mirrored centuries later by diplomats under the Shah. In his work Nezhat al-Qulub Mustawfi put 
forth a vision of Iran beyond today’s borders where “the islands situated between Sind and Oman 
and in the Persian Sea belong to Persia . . . the largest of which are Qis and Bahrain.”3 Mustawfi 
refers to Bahrain as an entity possessed by Persia, communicating the sense of a shared identity 
before the era of nationalism. What is also notable is how in this excerpt from Nezhat al-Qulub 
Bahrain is explicitly singled out. Although Mustawfi is using Bahrain to communicate size, one 
cannot ignore that fact that in the year 1307 Bahrain was not simply an island but an active 
component of the Persian Empire. Texts from as early as the tenth century, whilst not referring to 
the island of Bahrain by name, identify the same land as characteristically Persian.4 Additional 
texts like these serve as further evidence of a Persian identity beyond Persia which the Iranian 
2
3 Amirahmadi, Small Islands, Big Politics, 36.
4 Ibid.
government cited in its 20th century arguments of why Bahrain was neither independent nor a 
British territory. 
 The argument for Bahrain as part of Persia is best illustrated by examining the joint 
arguments put forth before the League of Nations by both London and Tehran between 1928 and 
1929. During this time political representatives of both countries aired their grievances on the 
international stage. Diplomatic personnel in Tehran viewed the recently concluded Treaty of 
Jeddah between the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Hedjaz and Nejd as a direct violation 
of Iran’s claim to Bahrain.5 In response Fatoullah Khan Pakrevan, the Acting Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Iran, crafted a document to be sent to both the Secretary-General of the 
League and to the British government regarding the history, justification, and legality of Persian 
jurisdiction over Bahrain.
 It is in this letter that the tenets of Iran’s case for why Bahrain is formally part of Persia 
proper is deconstructed. The letter was written by Iran’s foremost diplomat at the time and 
provides the most insight into what members of the Iranian government were thinking. The three 
facets on which the historically-rooted claim rests is articulated, beginning with the notion of 
uninterrupted occupation. Pakrevan wrote that with the exception of 1507 to 1622 — the time of 
Portuguese invasion — Bahrain has always been an integral part of Persia.6 Furthermore, it is 
asserted that international law dictates that a sovereign state is only detached when the lawful 
3
5 On May 20, 1927 the Treaty of Jeddah was signed between Great Britain and the Kingdom of the Hedjaz and Nejd. 
Hedjaz is located on the western coast of Saudi Arabia on the Red Sea, but it was not until 1932 this territory was 
referred to as Saudi Arabia. For further information on the Kingdom see J.H.W. Verzjil, International Law in 
Historical Perspective (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1973), 470. For reference to the protest of the Persian 
Government against this treaty see Fatoullah Khan Pakrevan, "Protest of the Persian Government Against Article 6 
of the Treaty Concluded Between Great Britain and the Hedjaz on May 20th, 1927," League of Nations – Official 
Journal, (1928): 1358-1362.
6 Pakrevan, "Protest of the Persian Government Against Article 6 of the Treaty Concluded Between Great Britain 
and the Hedjaz on May 20th, 1927," 1361.
owner of the territory officially recognizes its independence. In this case the state was Persia, and 
since the government had yet to acknowledge Bahraini independence it was still formally part of 
Iran.7. Lastly, the letter highlights that Persia’s claim rests on the existence of formal documents 
that show past rulers of Bahrain expressing their submission to Persian authorities and a history 
of paying taxes — thus establishing a fiscal relationship between the state and its people.8 
According to Iran at this time, “no independent State known as Bahrein has ever existed.”9 
Bahrain is but part of Persia, and ought to be viewed as such in the international community.
 The address also acts as a rebuttal against arguments Persian officials believed the British 
government might try to make. For instance, Pakrevan confronts the issue of language 
differentiation for whilst in Persia Farsi was the language of the people in Bahrain it remains 
Arabic. The minister snidely cited the vast size of the British Empire, which spanned across 
continents speaking different languages thus legitimizing the rule of a Farsi-speaking 
government over Arabic-speaking peoples. For the same reason, Iran argued that any attempt to 
invalidate their claim on the basis of geography must be ignored. Neither river, sea, nor ocean 
can serve to annul a claim, for the British empire had at the time 10,317 miles between London 
and Nukuʻalofa, the capital of the British protectorate of Tonga. Thus, Pakrevan asserted 
4
7 The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote that this was an “international juridical principal” and that “a 
territory belonging to a sovereign State cannot be lawfully detached so long as the right of ownership has not been 
transferred by this State to another State as of an official act, in this case by a treaty, or so long as its annexation by 
another State or its independence have not been recognised by the lawful owner of the territory.” This logic would 
suggest that since Persia has never “transferred” the “right of ownership” to another party, there is no possibility of 
Bahrain being “detached” from Iran. See: Pakrevan, "Protest of the Persian Government Against Article 6 of the 
Treaty Concluded Between Great Britain and the Hedjaz on May 20th, 1927," 1361.
8 Ibid. See comments made in the letter to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations by the Acting Minister in 
which he states that there is in existence “authentic documents . . . in which their [Bahrain] entire submission and 
loyalty to the central Government”26 is proven. The “tribal chieftains” of Bahrain, Pakrevan asserts, had historical 
paid taxes to Persia. it is also expressed that whilst some Bahrainis hold a rank as a “hereditary governor,” they are 
continuously subject to the central government of Persia. 
9  Pakrevan, "Protest of the Persian Government Against Article 6 of the Treaty Concluded Between Great Britain 
and the Hedjaz on May 20th, 1927," 1360.
“geographical and racial considerations can . . . be put forward only in the case of a state desiring 
to justify its claim to annex a new territory.”10 Bahrain was perceived by the Persian government 
not as a new claim, but one that had existed for centuries.
Pre-1968 Bahrain: A British Protectorate
 The letter to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations drew great criticism from the 
British Foreign Office11 where Bahrain was viewed as a protectorate of the United Kingdom. The 
state initially became commercially involved in the Persian Gulf in 1723 when the British East 
India Company established their first trading factory in Basra, Ottoman Iraq.12  Located on the 
Shatt al-Arab river between southernmost Iraq, Kuwait, and Iran, the factory was in a prime 
location for the expansion efforts of the British Empire.13 India was the jewel of Britain’s 
colonial crown, and Britain’s ability to harness and export India’s resources was therefore 
dependent on the security of maritime trade routes between the Indian Ocean and Western 
Europe. Out of fear of such security becoming compromised, London pursued politically-binding 
agreements with rulers of the small Gulf sheikhdoms which would decades later form the United 
Arab Emirates — otherwise known at the time as the trucial states. 
5
10  Pakrevan, "Protest of the Persian Government Against Article 6 of the Treaty Concluded Between Great Britain 
and the Hedjaz on May 20th, 1927," 1361.
11 Henceforth referred to as the Foreign Office.
12 Taylor Fain, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), 14. 
13 See the letter written by Elizabeth I on January 23 1601 in George Birdwood, The Register of Letters, &c., of the 
Governour and Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies, 1600-1619 (London: B. Quaritch, 
1893), 3.
 On March 19, 1891 Queen Victoria signed a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and 
Navigation with the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman.14 This was the first of many bi-lateral, 
politically binding agreements multiple sheikhdoms of the Gulf would sign with the United 
Kingdom over the course of the next decade. The agreement stipulated that the Sultan would not 
cede territory to any foreign power with the explicit exception of the United Kingdom. Secondly, 
the Sultan would not formulate new relationships with foreign governments and such 
proceedings would only be possible with London’s approval. In exchange the Sultan would 
receive protection from any and all external aggression.15 This treaty became a blueprint for 
subsequent covenants with other powers in the region. By the turn of the 20th century Yemen, 
Sudan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the trucial states had become either formal or informal 
protectorates of the United Kingdom.
 Thus, when the British Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain received a copy of the 
Persian Foreign Minister’s address regarding Bahrain he quickly drafted a response to the 
“unsupported declarations that Bahrein forms an integral part of Persia.”16 Secretary 
Chamberlain devoted four entire pages to contesting Iran’s contentions, asserting that the claim 
of uninterrupted occupation was false due to the fact that the troops of the sixth Shah of the Zand 
dynasty were driven from Bahrain by the Utubi Arabs never to fully reassert their control.17 
Furthermore, he scoffed at Iran’s interpretation of “international law.” Their back and forth in 
6
14 The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman was a state that encompassed both present-day Oman and parts of the United 
Arab Emirates. Muscat is the current capital of the nation of Oman, but in the 19th century this was the name of the 
territory.
15 Fain, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region, 15.
16 Austen Chamberlain, "The British Government to the Secretary-General of the League," League of Nations – 
Official Journal, (1929): 790-794.
17Chamberlain, "The British Government to the Secretary-General of the League," 791.
front of the League of Nations between 1928 and 1929 brought the issue of the sovereignty of 
Bahrain to the national stage but no resolution was reached.
   The dual British and Iranian claims to Bahrain were able to operate in tandem due to the 
nature of their contended sovereignty. Officials in neither London nor Tehran made decisions that 
directly influenced the population of Bahrain. In Tehran, Bahrain was viewed as Persia proper 
but a lenient policy of autonomous rule was consistently employed to keep peace and stability.18 
Since the second half of the eighteenth century the al-Khalifah family has reigned over Bahrain 
with the oldest son succeeding his father as monarch.19 In the mid-twentieth century the dual 
legal claim, however, would resurface when controversial governmental measures were 
introduced, as was the case in 1951 when laws were passed to extend the Iranian oil 
nationalization project to the Bahrain Petroleum Company.20 Similarly, in 1957 when the Iranian 
Government declared Bahrain Iran’s 14th province, London received the news with outcry.21 The 
dispute over rightful sovereignty did not strain the Anglo-Iranian relationship in its entirety. The 
importance of other issues continued to overshadow arguments over rightful legal jurisdiction 
and the dispute seemingly came to a standstill. This all changed in January 1968 when the British 
Prime Minister announced British forces would be disengaging from the Persian Gulf, and the 
Shah expressed a similar desire to abandon the Iranian states ties to the isle.
7
18 Ali Rastbeen, The Three Iranian Islands of the Persian Gulf: Based on Documents and Historical Evidence (Paris: 
Institut International D'Études Stratégiques, 2008), 141.
19 Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Oman (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 82-84.
20 The nationalization of Iran’s oil will be specifically examined in the following chapter of this analysis. 
21 Roham Alvandi, "Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Bahrain Question, 1968-1970," British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies 37, no. 2 (2010): 162.
The Persian Gulf Post-1968: Negotiations, Abandonment, and Annexation 
 The question of why the Shah made the decision to abandon the Iranian claim to Bahrain 
in 1968 is not the focus of this analysis, nor does it have a complex answer. In 1968 there was 
clear strategic imperative for relinquishing the Iranian states tie to the island.22 Following the 
1967 Six Day War, the Shah felt increasingly ostracized by his neighbors for his lack of support 
for the Palestinian cause. Additionally, the British announcement to withdraw all forces from the 
Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula roused fears about a possible vacuum for influence where 
the British had been active. The Shah sought to create a regional defense framework for the 
Persian Gulf, which would protect Iranian oil transports that accounted for 38 per cent of Iranian 
government spending in 1968.23 However, the claim to Bahrain remained an obstacle to 
formalizing such an agreement, and it was with these considerations in mind that the Shah found 
it key to relinquish the historically-rooted ties between the two territories.24
 This research project aims to explore what happens when territory is abandoned, and 
begins by answering the question of why the Shah kept the negotiations concerning the Iranian 
claim a secret.  What was the process employed to relinquish the claim to the island? Once this 
outcome was achieved Iranian troops occupied three additional islands in the Persian Gulf: Abu 
Masa, Greater Tunbs, and Lesser Tunbs.  Diplomatic cables identify a possible agreement 
between Iran and the United Kingdom which would permit an exchange of territory so this 
research also begs the question of whether there was a “deal” in play for Iran to dispose of her 
claim to Bahrain and in return get to seize other territory.
8
22 Alvandi, "Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Bahrain Question," 159-162. 
23 Mark J. Gasiorowski, U.S. foreign policy and the shah: building a client state in Iran (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1991): 102-103.
24 Ibid. 
 Chapter one begins by appraising the relationship between Persia and the United 
Kingdom in the early twentieth century. I argue that substantial foreign economic activity 
fostered an anti-imperialist attitude in Iran, which was further exacerbated by the role of external 
governments in overthrowing the democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister in 1953.  Anti-
interventionist and specifically anti-British sentiment shaped the negotiations regarding the 
disposal of the Iranian claim to Bahrain in their entirety. Utilizing archival materials I then go on 
to piece together the negotiations which took place from January 1968 to March 1970 where the 
Shah sought to abandon the Iranian claim. The different phases of the 26 months of diplomacy 
will be highlighted, as well as the faulty chronology commonly employed by other scholars.
 Following reconstructing the negotiations that led to the Shah disposing of the 
longstanding Iranian claim to Bahrain, chapter two employs a thematic account to illustrate 
varying motivations, considerations, and long-term goals of the parties involved. I assert that 
diplomatic cables and communiqués reveal four key themes. Firstly, domestic politics were 
crucial in dictating the course of negotiations for the rulers of both Iran and Bahrain — albeit for 
very different reasons. Secondly, it becomes apparent that on both the national and international 
level there was anxiety regarding religious dynamics. It will then be shown how the fate of a 
security network amongst smaller Gulf states was linked to the outcome of the Bahrain 
negotiations. Lastly, critical analysis reveals the Shah, whilst concerned with public opinion, 
acted consistently independent from his political advisers. 
 Chapter three turns to examining whether or not there was a deal crafted in which the 
Shah would relinquish the Iranian claim to Bahrain and in return get to seize the islands of Abu 
Masa, Greater Tunbs, and Lesser Tunbs in the Persian Gulf. The fact of the matter is is that on 
9
the eve of British formal withdrawal from the region in 1971 Iran laid claim to new territory after 
denouncing others, which leaves room for speculation regarding what may have occurred behind 
closed doors. I argue that historians have missed documented evidence of a British proposal for a 
packaged settlement. However, evidence of a packaged settlement is not proof that territorial 
changes were the product of a deal and I conclude that whilst a quid pro quo exchange was 
initially put forth there is not enough evidence that this was the groundwork for territorial 
changes in November 1971.
 Chapter four evaluates these transformations contending that they remain relevant to the 
Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula today. The 2011 uprisings in Bahrain illustrate how a 
lingering sense of Iranian identity have served as justification for the systematic discrimination 
of the Shia population of Bahrain. Continued threats of annexation by officials in the Iranian 
government also serve to heighten tensions between the two states. This chapter exhibits how the 
Iranian government’s continued claim of sovereignty over the islands inhabited by Iranian forces 
in the autumn of 1971 remains a main point of contention in the relationship between Iran and 
the United Arab Emirates.
 In conducting this analysis a wide variety of sources are utilized. When engaging with the 
negotiations themselves Arabian Boundaries: New Documents, 1966-1975 is employed.25 The 
multi-volume series is comprised of diplomatic telegrams, communiqués, and briefings as 
exchanged between British diplomatic personnel in the Persian Gulf. As a result of Britain’s 
thirty-year rule all correspondence and memorandums have been made public — this includes all 
10
25  Richard Schofield and Elizabeth Evans, eds., Arabian boundaries: new documents : 1966-1975 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Archive Edition, 2009).
documents then deemed “secret.”26 Beyond providing insight to ongoing debates and the general 
negotiation process, the direct quotes of foremost negotiators from Iran and Bahrain as to be 
relayed to other embassies gained from this correspondence are invaluable. There is no 
accessible historical record in Iran and Bahrain of these negotiations. Inaccessibility of archives, 
lack of translation, and limited publishing practices are all contributing factors. In Bahrain, there 
is no law governing access to diplomatic archives.27
 The oral history projects of Zohreh Sullivan at the University of Illinois, the Center for 
Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University, and the Foundation for Iranian Studies have 
additionally lent themselves to making this analysis as rigorous and balanced as possible. The 
records respectively provide insight to the silenced narrative of the middle and lower classes 
under the reign of the Shah. Furthermore, they offer commentary on the general trends and 
transformations of Iranian society in the twentieth century. These interviews provide an intimate 
look into the strategies and concerns of prominent diplomatic officials during the negotiations 
between 1968 and 1971.  The final chapter, which deals with contemporary politics, employs 
journalistic sources.
11
26 The thirty-year rule is a law of the United Kingdom  which states that all government papers must be released 
publicly thirty years after they have been drafted. Following the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act in 2010, 
there is now a twenty-year rule concerning government documents of the United Kingdom. The twenty-year rule 
was enacted in August 2013. 
27 Office of the Historian at the U.S. Department of State, "World Wide Diplomatic Archives Index: Bahrain," U.S. 
Department of State, https://history.state.gov/countries/archives/bahrain.
“A Great Civilization involves, in the first instance, a choice.”28
– Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
   Shah of Iran 
   1980
  Chapter 1: A Need for Secrecy 
Introductory Remarks
 On October 28, 1968 Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi wrote to Sir Denis Wright, the 
British Ambassador to Iran, that in order for the people of Iran to accept his decision to abandon 
the Iranian claim it was essential to show it had been dropped in conformity with internationally 
recognized procedures.29 After decades of hotly claiming Bahrain was not an independent state 
and that it was formally part of Iran, the Shah could not be seen to simply be abandoning 
territory with reason. The Iranian government had repeatedly professed, as articulated in Iran’s 
1928 petition to the League of Nations written by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, that 
the Bahrain islands belonged to Persia.30 How then was Iran, seemingly out of nowhere to 
relinquish its claim to what some believed to be Persia proper? Furthermore, how was the Shah 
to manipulate events so not to appear to be conspiring with the British? 
 Having established in the introduction that it was from a desire for Arab-Iranian 
rapprochement that the Shah sought to abandon Iran’s longstanding claim to Bahrain, this 
chapter will examine why and how the Shah went to such lengths to procure the outcome he 
12
28 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, The Shah's Story, trans. Teresa Waugh (London: Michael Joseph, 1980), 124.
29 Alvandi, "Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Bahrain Question," 168.
30 Pakrevan, "Protest of the Persian Government Against Article 6 of the Treaty Concluded Between Great Britain 
and the Hedjaz on May 20th, 1927," 1360.
desired. I argue that the long history of foreign economic and political activity in Iran nurtured an 
anti-imperialist and anti-interventionist domestic attitude. By engaging with economic 
development at the turn of the 20th century and the episode that overthrew the democratically 
elected Iranian Prime Minister in 1953 it will be displayed why the Shah felt compelled to keep 
the negotiations with British diplomats between 1968 and 1970 shrouded in secrecy. After a 
comprehensive analysis of the national landscape I will then reconstruct the phrases of over two 
years of diplomacy that culminated in the formal relinquishment of the Iranian claim to Bahrain.
Iran’s Domestic Landscape 
Iranian opposition towards foreign interference has its roots in the domestic conditions 
at the turn of the twentieth century. Janet Afary, an Iranian academic at the University of 
California, Santa Barbara, has succinctly written in her work on the Iranian Constitutional 
Revolution31 that “nineteenth-century development in Iran should be characterized as colonial 
and dependent, serving the best interests of foreign merchants rather than the native 
community.”32 It was not one distinct social class who suffered from Western33 interference in 
domestic socio-economic affairs, but all Iranians. The lower classes and the bourgeoisie were 
equally afflicted by active foreign economic activity in Iran: peasants could not afford 
13
31 The Persian Constitutional Revolution took place between 1905 and 1906. An immediate outcome of the 
revolution was the creation of parliament in Persia, known as the Majlis. For more on the subject see: Nikki R. 
Keddie, “Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective,” The American Historical Review 88, no. 3 (1983): 
579-598; and Nader Sohrabi, “Historicizing Revolutions: Constitutional Revolutions in the Ottoman Empire, Iran, 
and Russia, 1905-1907,” The American Journal of Sociology 100, no. 6 (1995): 1383-1447.
32 Janet Afary, The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906-1911: Grassroots Democracy, Social Democracy & the 
Origins of Feminism (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996), 19.
33 “Western” in this instance does not refer to the countries that constituted the Western bloc during the Cold War. In 
Iranian politics “the West” refers to Russia as well. See Vladislav Zubok,  A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the 
Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).
necessities due to price hikes and middle-class merchants lost trading opportunities as a result of 
increased foreign import and export practices. During the Constitutional Revolution the 
bourgeoisie aimed to curtail foreign investment to protect their own interests.34 Thus, discontent  
with foreign involvement in Iran is found across all Iranian social classes at the turn of the 
century.
This anti-imperialist stance is very much apparent in Iranian literature. Whilst the 
majority of the works produced in the modern period are fictional in content and cannot be 
accepted purely as fact, that does not mean they cannot be utilized in historical analysis of the 
period. Many works illustrate common themes, motifs, symbols and allusions which display 
common opposition to foreign social, economic, and political expansion into Persia, the 
Persian Gulf, and the broader Middle East.35 One example of this is a novel The Travel Diary of 
Ebrahim Beyg, written in 1902, which tells the tale of an Iranian born and raised in Cairo 
who, upon growing up, decides to venture to Iran, where instead of the paradise his father 
described Iran to be, finds that:
What is lacking is law. There is no order; hence, the duty of the individual, 
including the ruler and the ruled, the subject and the official, is unclear. 
For this reason, there are no schools and no taxes, but bribery, dictatorship 
and extortion do exist. Cities are left in ruins. Fields are left barren. Waters 
are stagnant. It is difficult to walk through the alleys for the stench. 
Beggars have become viziers and viziers have turned to be beggars. 
Affairs are in the hands of the incompetent. Extortion, turmoil and chaos 
are rampant.36
14
34 Hamid Dabashi, Iran: A People Interrupted (New York: New Press, 2007), 77.
35 See M. R. Ghanoonparvar, In a Persian Mirror: Images of the West and Westerners in Iranian Fiction (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1993) and Nahid Mozaffari, Strange Times, My Dear: The PEN Anthology of 
Contemporary Iranian Literature (New York: Arcade Pub., 2005) and Dabashi, Iran: A People Interrupted.
36 Maragheh-’i Zeynol’abdein, Siyahatnameh-ye Ebrahim Beyg (Tehran: Sadaf, 1965/1966) as found in M. R. 
Ghanoonparvar, Prophets of Doom: Literature as a Socio-political Phenomenon in Modern Iran (Lanham, M.D.: 
University Press of America, 1984), 3.
Zeynol’abdein Maragheh-‘i’s novel illustrates Iran at the turn of the century and became one of 
the most popular texts in Iran because it was accessible to the public as result of its tone, 
realism, and basic syntax.37 The language was not pompous and grandiose as the majority of the 
works from the period, and resonated with many Iranians.38 The work realistically portrayed the state 
of the national education system in which there were no school, but more importantly the state of the 
government in which bribery and extortion went unchecked. Those in power were not there as a result of 
professional qualifications, but qualified pockets.   
 Already existing domestic opposition towards external actors became exacerbated by the 
episode which usurped Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh from power in August 1953. Born in 
1882, Mossadegh  was a wealthy landowner and lawyer who after many years in public service 
was elected in 1920 to the Iranian Parliament, better known as the Majles. He would become 
the 60th Prime Minister of Iran with the campaign platform of introducing sweeping social and 
political reforms. Included in his progressive campaign was a bill submitted to the Majles to 
nationalize the oil industry in Iran. As the leader of the Iranian National Front39 Mossadegh 
was not alone in seeking the expulsion of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) from Iran. 
The Islamic clergy welcomed the expulsion of Western corruptive influence from Iran, and 
other groups viewed the AIOC as the greatest manifestation of foreign intervention in Iran’s 
economy.40 Mossadegh’s bill roused massive domestic support, and on March 20, 1951 the 
company was nationalized, taking away both power and profits from the AIOC.
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  At the time of nationalization the British government owned 50% of the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company’s stock and utilized the profits to finance the empire.41 The company’s oil-
refinery at Abadan was itself valued at over £120 million and was Westminster’s single-most 
expensive overseas investment. Such financial gains from oil production were key for Britain 
who had spent over a quarter of its national wealth during World War II. With the economy 
still recovering, the British government could not afford to lose its most lucrative financial 
resource.42 British negotiators sought to draw up an agreement that would address many 
of Mossadegh’s grievances and reverse nationalization but the proposed settlement 
simply offered Iran too little, too late.43
  Authorities in London not only objected to Iran’s nationalization as result of the threat 
to Britain’s fiscal situation, but also on the theory that oil produced in Iran was rightfully 
British. At the time of Mossadegh’s nationalization, high-ranking officials from the United 
Kingdom argued that oil found in Iran was not rightfully Iranian. This is evidenced by the 
writing of the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Fuel and Power who wrote in a 
letter that:
it was British enterprise, skill and effort which discovered oil under the 
soil of Persia, which has got the oil out, which has built the refinery, which 
has developed markets for Persian oil in 30 or 40 countries, with wharves, 
storage tanks and pumps, road and rail tanks, and other distribution 
facilities, and also an immense fleet of tankers. This was done at a time 
when there was no easy outlet for Persian oil in competition with 
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the vastly greater American oil industry.44
 Thus, he argues oil was discovered by William Knox D’arcy, an entrepreneur from Newton 
Abbot, England, and subsequently refined, produced, and managed by Englishmen for 
decades following. The Under-Secretary contends that none of these things could have 
occurred if the Persian government and Persian people had been left to their own devices.45
As a result, London authorized a three-track policy consisting of legal maneuvers 
economic sanctions, and planning of covert operations to reverse nationalization.46 Beginning 
in the spring of 1951 Britain strategized with the pursuit of, as succinctly articulated by the 
historian Mark Gasiorowski, “reestablish[ing] their control over Iran’s oil by either pressuring 
Mosaddeq into a favorable settlement or by removing him from office.”47 Endeavors 
undertaken over the following months included making legal appeals to the International Court 
of Justice and the United States; a production slowdown by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; 
laying off 20,000 Iranian oil workers at the Abadan oil fields; and pressuring the Shah to install 
other politicians in Mossadegh’s place.48 These tactics proved futile, and the dispute remained 
unresolved. 
In autumn of 1951 British officials registered a complaint against Iran on behalf of the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company at the meeting of the United Nations Security Council. The British 
were up in arms, and whilst expressing his refusal to negotiate with representatives of the 
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Foreign Office Mossadegh came before the United Nations in October to utilize what he called, 
“the ultimate refuge of weak and oppressed nations”49 in hope of once and for all ceasing any 
claim Britain had to Iran’s oil production facilities. Mossadegh commented on the socio-
economic state of affairs in Iran and the history of the AIOC’s operations, saying that in the 
year 1948 alone the company’s accounts revealed that whilst its net value was sixty-one million 
pounds Iran only received nine million. The Iranian governments yield was three times less 
than the twenty eight million pounds that were awarded to the British treasury as a result of 
income tax alone.50 Mossadegh made his case to the Council, as he had to the international 
community prior, for the complete and continued nationalization of oil production in Iran.
At the 560th meeting of the Security Council British officials slandered Mossadegh’s 
nationalist stance, characterizing the Iranian approach to negotiations as wholeheartedly 
negative.51 Defamatory statements were exchanged by all parties, and on the third and final 
day of the session the Iranian Ambassador to the United States stated on Mossadegh’s behalf 
that the company would never again operate in Iran through trusteeship nor contract.52 The 
session of the United Nations Security Council voted to postpone discussion of the subject, 
leaving the British without their desired result and embarrassed on the international stage.
 When Mossadegh first arrived in New York, President Harry Truman embraced him and 
applauded his strength to combat imperialism. With such a pleasant exchange between leaders, 
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and American political passivity towards the oil debacle in Iran, why then did American 
decision makers coordinate intervention in Iranian domestic politics just a year following? The 
answer is found in examining the philosophy of political actors during the Cold War. In the 
midst of greater conflict with the U.S.S.R. Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey made up the 
“Northern Tier” strategy in which the countries would act as a blockade between Russia and the 
rest of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.53 By the time Dwight Eisenhower succeeded 
Truman some in the administration were no longer assured that the Iranian people universally 
supported Mossadegh as they had prior. The domestic landscape had transformed, and fearing 
cracks in their strategy to combat communism and Soviet Union the United States became 
involved; forever changing the course of Iran’s political future. 
 The Eisenhower administration’s concerns are illustrated in a policy proposal crafted by 
the United States National Security Council in November, 1952 which highlights the 
opportunities for Soviet infiltration in Iran.54 The timing of this policy is of great relevance for it 
was written just weeks following the expulsion of the British diplomatic service upon 
Mossadegh’s discovery of British plans to overthrow him.55 With the Foreign Office no longer 
able to “unilaterally to assure stability” members of the U.S. National Security Council felt that the 
U.S.S.R. might gain political control of Iran.56 The latter statement was supported by the fact that the 
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pan-Iranist party which was once united behind Mossadegh and his democratic aims was now 
split into two factions: pro– and anti–Mossadegh.57 Furthermore, the Prime Minister had nearly 
exhausted Iran’s financial reserves and spending was exceeding revenue; a practice not 
conducive to delivering on the promises of economic and social betterment which he had 
pledged to make a reality.58 The American government could no longer be certain that 
Mossadegh would be able to retain control, and the possibility of someone from the communist 
Tudeh party ascending in domestic politics was viewed as too threatening to ignore. Thus, in 
August 1953, President Eisenhower authorized the Central Intelligence Agency of the United 
States to initiate Operation AJAX. Led by Kermit Roosevelt Jr., the grandson of President 
Theodore Roosevelt, the planned coup succeeded in overthrowing Mosadegh in August 1953.59 
Whilst the British government had been conspiring to such ends since Mossadegh’s nationalization 
of the oil industry, for America the decision to usurp the Prime Minister had its origins with the 
security of his rule in the context of the Cold War. Despite their differing motivations the people of 
Iran would always remember the interference of America and the United Kingdom in Iran’s domestic 
politics and their decisive role in determining the future trajectory of political authority in Iran.
 The Shah’s loyalty to the Iranian people was increasingly coming into question, and as 
noted by one of the subjects of Sullivan’s oral history project after Mossadegh was overthrown 
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an air of illegitimacy hung around the Shah.60 This came greatly as the result of his increasingly 
militaristic policies and autocratic rule pursued following the coup.61 Instances of 
disappearance, torture, and death became the norm as American support allowed for the creation 
of the military police and intelligence network known as SAVAK.62 A month after the 
Mossadegh had been usurped and the Shah’s authority centralized a U.S. colonel 
working for the Central Intelligence Agency came to Iran to aid the Military Governor of Tehran 
in training an initial security squad in techniques for intelligence, surveillance, and 
interrogation.63 As recounted by Hussein Fardust, who later served as the Deputy Head of 
SAVAK, it was at this time that the small team assisted with liquidating the Shah’s opponents 
through the discovery and eradication of oppositional groups.64 
The extent SAVAK’s control over the Iranian domestic climate is illustrated by an article 
published in the New York Times in 1958. Six days following the military coup which murdered 
the king of Iraq and brought two generals to power the American newspaper ran a piece on 
Iran’s domestic landscape, and sought to examine if a similar coup would be possible in the 
neighboring country of Iran.65 The article stated that no internal subversion would be possible in 
Iran, with the Shah retaining complete personal control. In regards to the opinion of the Iranian 
21
60 Zohreh Sullivan, Exiled Memories: Stories of Iranian Diaspora (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001), 96.
61 Ali Ansari, Modern Iran since 1921: the Pahlavis and After (London: Pearson Education, 2003), 75.
62 Gholam Afkhami, The Life and times of the Shah (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2009), 381.
63 Mark Gasiorowski, "Central Intelligence Agency in Persia," Encyclopedia Iranica, Originally published December 
15, 1991. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/central-intelligence-agency-cia-in-persia.
64 Hussein Fardust, The Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty: Memoirs of Former General Hussein Fardust, trans. 
Ali Akbar Dareini (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1999), 217.
65 For more information on the 1958 revolution in Iraq see Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) and Marion and Peter Sluglett, Iraq since 1958 from Revolution to Dictatorship (London: 
I.B. Tauris, 2001).
people, The New York Times commented that “Iranians say that the Savak (secret police) is so 
efficient that a conspiracy in the army similar to the one that overthrew King Faisal of Iraq 
would be unthinkable here.”66
Five years later the Shah implemented a series of national reforms known as the 
White Revolution and which included the expansion of a land reform program, the 
nationalization of forests and pastures, the enfranchisement of women, and a rural literacy 
program.67  These reforms were ratified to appease public opinion and ensure the stability and 
durability of the regime.68 However, the resiliency of the regime was also solidified by the 
expansion of SAVAK. Any expression of sentiment seemingly in opposition to the Shah and 
more broadly the government faced serious repercussions. The award winning Polish journalist 
Ryszard Kapuściński’s wrote that “all walls can have ears and every door or gate can lead to the 
secret police.”69 His words poignantly illustrated the reality in Iran and the overwhelming sense 
of fear, loss, and powerlessness, that:
Whoever fell into the grip of that organization disappeared without a trace, 
sometimes forever. People would vanish suddenly and nobody would 
know what had happened to them, where to go, whom to ask, whom to 
appeal to. They might be locked up in a prison, but which one? There were 
six thousand. An invisible, adamant wall would rise up, before which you 
stood helpless, unable to take a step forward. Iran belonged to SAVAK, but 
within the country the police acted like an under-ground organization that 
appeared then disappeared, hiding its tracks, leaving no forwarding 
address.70
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An Amnesty International report estimates that before the fall of the Shah as many as 25,000 to 
100,000 political prisoners were subject to interrogation and torture at the hands of the 
state-sponsored internal repression mechanism.71
In 1953 in order to preserve their national interests, America and the United Kingdom 
interfered in Iran’s domestic affairs. In its place, they solidified and centralized the power of 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. He constructed a repressive state in which the masses of Iran saw 
their harsh reality as a result of the foreign intervention, and harbored increasing resentment 
towards both America and the United Kingdom. Thus, in relinquishing Iran’s claim to Bahrain 
— a stance politicians in London had urged for decades — it was crucial for the Shah to not 
seem as to be at the bidding of London. It was of utmost importance for the Shah to have the 
veil of “internationally recognized procedures”72  as articulated by the Iranian Ambassador to 
Iran to the Foreign Office in October 1968. However, simply agreeing on an international 
approach to renouncing Iran’s territory did not prescribe a course of action to be undertaken 
and earlier that year such an approach was not even under consideration by the Shah.
The Negotiations
 The twenty six months of shuttle diplomacy that would formally dispose of the Iranian 
states claim to Bahrain began in January 1968. In a meeting with the Shah in the first week of the 
new year, the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs announced the Prime Minister’s 
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decision to withdraw all British troops from the Persian Gulf. The Shah himself voiced a desire 
to abandon the longstanding Iranian claim, contending that a public referendum such as a 
plebiscite, which examined Bahraini public opinion would be necessary.73 This initiated 
continued conversations between the Shah and diplomatic officials in Tehran and London. As 
documented by the British Ambassador to Iran in his annual review that year, the Shah was 
incredibly anxious about the possibility of going “down in history as the man who lightly 
abandoned his country’s ‘14th Province’”74 yet remained adamant about wanting to relinquish 
Iran’s longstanding claim. Beginning in January 1968 all conversations in regards to Bahrain 
centered around the Shah’s determination to hold a plebiscite which would serve as justification 
for relinquishing formal ties to the islands.
 However, a plebiscite would not prove to be a viable option. Since the Shah first 
proposed this course of action the Emir of Bahrain, Isa bin Salman Al-Khalifah (r. 1961 - 
1999),75 objected for he believed it would trigger domestic violence and that any introduction 
of procedures aiming to gauge the social attitude would spur further chaos.76 Such sentiments 
were relayed vis-à-vis British diplomatic staff. Since the Iranian government did not 
recognize the independent status of the Bahraini government, there could not be direct 
negotiations between the parties.77 As a result, British ambassadors and diplomatic officials 
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served as intermediaries for the duration of the negotiations. Following initial conversations 
in January 1968 the Foreign Office came to view a public referendum as an unfeasible 
option, as the Emir of Bahrain had argued. Any sort of plebiscite would not be acceptable for 
it could not, with certainty, bring about the relinquishment of Iran’s claim.78
 Roham Alvandi remains the only historian to engage critically with the 
negotiations over Iran’s claim to Bahrain and he has constructed a timeline for the 
negotiations which I prove to be not entirely accurate. In his analysis he contends that 
from January to August 1968 all discussions were concerned with the Shah’s wish for 
a plebiscite and that by December he had agreed to forgo one.79 As late as the end of 
August, in a meeting with the British Ambassador to Iran stationed in Tehran, the 
Shah expressed in regards to Bahrain that “historically I’ve got a claim to it, and 
therefore, if I’m going to give it up . . . I must have some face saving formula.”80 The Shah 
remained committed to relinquishing Iran’s claim to Bahrain through a plebiscite or public 
referendum. Similarly, the Ambassador acknowledged that right up until December 1968 
conversations regarding Bahrain remained at an impasse due because of a possible 
plebiscite.81 The Shah’s call for a public referendum did not cease in August 1968 as Alvandi 
asserts, but extended into the later months of the year. 
 Right before Christmas, however, progress was made. The Shah became receptive to 
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the idea of utilizing the United Nations as the disposal of the Iranian states claim to Bahrain 
which had not yet been suggested.82 He agreed in secret to forgo a plebiscite in its entirety, 
and in the first week of the new year made an announcement that shocked negotiators and 
citizens alike. When asked about Bahrain at a press conference in New Delhi he responded 
that “I won’t enter into details now but anything that will be the expression of the will of the 
people of Bahrain, we, you, the world will recognise as the will of the people of that 
Island.”83 Whilst representatives of the British Foreign Office, including the British Ambassador to Iran, 
were aware the Shah had been responsive to the proposed course to abandon the Iranian claim the Shah 
had given the impression it would be a long time before this could occur due to the need to educate public 
opinion.84 Publicly expressing his willingness to let the people of Bahrain decide their own 
destiny in January 1969, he signaled a new phase of negotiations in which the parties 
involved began to seriously consider how to deal with the claim on the international stage. 
 Both the Shah of Iran and the Emir of Bahrain had accepted exploring the idea of 
using the United Nations but dozens of procedural questions remained unanswered.85 
Therefore, between January and August 1969 discussions were concerned with the intricacies 
that would be key in generating the outcome all desired: the relinquishment of Iran’s claim to 
Bahrain.86 Would the United Nations simply send a representative? Correspondence reveals a 
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debate amongst British diplomats over whom would be a better candidate: a Venezuelan or a 
Pakistani.87 Perhaps instead it would be better to employ the International Court of Justice — 
the judiciary service of the United Nations. However, putting cases before the Court would 
required the production of genuine legal documents, and the ruling could not be predicted 
both in terms of jurisdiction and substance. Even the British, seemingly with the most power 
on the international stage, readily admitted that proceedings put before the Court could not 
be fixed so there would be no certainty that the found result would be a Bahraini desire to be 
independent of Iran.88 Additionally, if the Court route were pursued, who would petition the 
claim? Bahrain was not a Statute of the Court and as such did not possess the right and Iran 
was out of the question.89 The British Foreign Office conducted studies regarding the 
feasibility of multiple options including negotiation, arbitration or adjudication, and United 
Nations involvement.90 The Iranians, meanwhile, were adamant on having the authority of 
United Nations Security Council. All proposals suggested seemingly came with too much 
risk and none were willing to leave anything to chance.
The solution was found in a modified arrangement of a plan of British origin, but
eventually Bahraini-proposed joint Anglo-Iranian approach to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations U Thant. The Shah had objected to this proposal on the basis that if the United 
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Kingdom and Iran appealed to the United Nations in unison, it would appear that they were 
colluding together which was unacceptable to the Shah who was extremely conscious of how 
the Iranian public would perceive events. The Shah therefore modified the proposal, suggesting 
that Iran make the sole approach to the United Nations, and once the mission to Bahrain had 
occurred, the United Nations Security Council would authorize its findings.  This formula 
provided the the Shah cover for his decision to abandon the Iranian claim and gave him the 
legitimacy of an international body.91 Furthermore, the overall abandonment of the notion of a 
plebiscite would be shifted from the Shah to the United Nations, keeping the Shah’s image 
intact.92
 By April 1969 diplomatic personnel from London, Tehran, and Manama had accepted 
this approach. However, the question persisted of how the Shah was to petition the claim to 
the United Nations and what methodology was to be employed to gauge the wishes of the 
Bahraini people. The question of procedure stalled negotiations for months for whilst the 
Shah wanted to leave all matters to the Secretary-General, British and Bahraini diplomats 
were committed to having the whole procedure scripted. For months no parties would budge 
as one British official noted:
We are receiving a mass of telegrams and savingrams about the 
negotiations on this subject. We are very grateful to be kept informed but it  
is a highly complex affair of drafts, counter-drafts and counter-counter-
drafts, bandied about among the five parties to the negotiations; and my 
head for one is beginning to spin.93
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Members of the Foreign Office were assured that a deadlock had been reached that was 
unable to be broken by drafting alone.94 The Shah, despite supporting the general usage 
of the United Nations, refused to commit to drafting specifics of a mission to Bahrain. 
He believed that if he did so he would run risk for being publicly exposed as an architect 
of Iranian relinquishment. Alvandi argues that out of a wish to move forward the Shah 
agreed to compromise on the methodology to be employed.95 Thus, on September 2 
1969, the Shah told the British Ambassador, Sir Denis Wright, that given he was kept in 
ignorance British and Bahraini diplomatic personnel could dictate the modes of 
procedure for the future mission.96 
However, the Secretary-General could not allow the Shah to claim such such blind 
ignorance. U Thant made clear that the only way he would allow a formal petition to send a 
United Nations mission to Bahrain was if there was first a secret, informal approach to his 
offices made by representatives of both Iran and Britain. He contended that this would ensure 
general agreement regarding the procedures that would soon follow and would serve as an 
insurance mechanism to hold all parties accountable before it turned into a public affair.97 The 
Shah remained committed to being absent from the process of planning and the principal 
Iranian negotiator Amir Khosrow Afshar told the British Ambassador in Tehran that “if U 
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Thant communicated the method of operation to the Iranian Government in any form, written 
or oral, formal or informal and even if someone just whispered in Vakil’s98 ear, the Iranians 
would say that they were opposed to this method of operation.” The Secretary-General therefore 
did not ask the Iranian diplomats to sign a memorandum as he had demanded prior, but instead 
opted to ask for a vague summary to which the diplomats obliged. With a nonspecific brief 
crafted, the following morning an official memorandum of the anticipated United Nations 
mission to Bahrain was delivered to the Iranian embassy in New York.99
With an informal approach concluded, the last and final stage of negotiations over Iran’s 
claim to Bahrain began; lasting from December 1969 till March 1970. During this time all 
parties were concerned with the wording of Iran’s formal approach to the United Nations and 
Secretary- General U Thant. The language had to be legitimate, yet vague enough to allow for 
the engineered result. For three months all negotiators struggled over what consequences varied 
phrasings such as “wishes of the inhabitants” and “future status” might have.100 For example, 
the word “report” was substituted by more abstract “findings.”101 Events could not proceed 
until all options were exhausted in finding the most perfect choice — a seemingly common 
theme throughout the entirety of the negotiations.
On March 9, 1970 Mehdi Vakil, the Permanent Representative of Iran to the United
Nations formally delivered his petition to the Secretary-General. He expressed in writing the 
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Iranian desire to have “the wishes of the people of Bahrain . . . ascertained through Your 
Excellency’s good offices” and a willingness to accept their findings after they had been 
endorsed by the United Nations Security Council.102 Adhering to a pre-established timetable, 
the British soon gave their additional formal support to the Mission of the United Nations to 
Bahrain.103 The Shah had prepared the people of Iran for the outcome he had helped to 
engineer through distributing pamphlets amongst the armed forces, the civil service, and 
universities which detailed why the Iranian claim was unsound.104 Similarly, the Emir of 
Bahrain had compiled a list of acceptable Bahraini institutions and clubs105 which would be 
appropriate to solicit opinion from.106 After twenty six months of dealing with how Iran was 
to relinquish its claim and what methodology was to be employed to achieve such an aim, 
deliberations concluded.
On May 11, 1970, all delegates of the United Nations Security Council voted to adopt 
the procured findings of the Secretary-Generals appointed mission to Bahrain. Lord Caradon, 
the British Ambassador to the United Nations, went so far as to say before the Council that it 
was unnecessary to speak in detail about the vote which had been taken that day. “The task is 
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completed; the object attained; the success achieved.”107 In January of 1968 Mohammad Reza 
Shah Pahlavi was adamant about relinquishing the Iranian claim to the islands. It had taken 
over two years of thoughtful deliberation between authorities of the United Kingdom, Bahrain, 
and Iran, but as of May 11, 1970 the Iranian claim could be justifiably abandoned.
Concluding Remarks 
 Through tracing the rise of foreign economic actors light was shed on the anti-
imperialist and anti-interventionist nature of the Iranian domestic landscape at the turn of the 
twentieth century. This attitude was exacerbated by the continued role of external forces in 
overthrowing the Iranian Prime Minister in 1953, and centralizing the Shah’s authority through 
support for the institutionalized military police network SAVAK. Such an examination was 
imperative to understanding why the Shah was vehement about keeping negotiations between 
1968 and 1970 entirely secret. 
 Using diplomatic cables to reconstruct the negotiations, I highlighted the different 
phases of the shuttle diplomacy that led to the relinquishment of the historically-rooted Iranian 
claim to Bahrain. After learning of the British intent to withdraw all forces from the Persian 
Gulf by 1971, the Shah made clear in secret his desire to dispose of Iranian ties to the island of 
Bahrain. The Shah’s initial discussions with the British representatives over the claim were 
only concerned with holding a public referendum in Bahrain to ascertain the wishes of the 
people. Out of uncertainty that this would bring about the desired result, and objections from 
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the Emir of Bahrain, such a procedure was ruled out. Instead, all parties agreed to explore 
utilizing the United Nations. After hashing out logistics and technicalities in the summer of 
1969 diplomats of Iran and the United Kingdom made a secret, joint informal approach to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations which was followed by a public, formal approach by 
just Iran once debates over approach and wording had been resolved. This reconstruction also 
highlighted the false chronology of other scholars. Now that I have detailed how precisely the 
negotiations unfolded I will turn to recurrent themes as a lens for understanding varying parties 
strategic motivations, the course of the negotiations themselves, and consequential outcomes.
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“Between ourselves, do you suppose that we are acting as traitors
to our country by going ahead with this settlement over Bahrain?”108
– Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
   Shah of Iran 
   1970
Chapter 2: Deconstructing Diplomacy
 Introductory Remarks
In analyzing the discussions over the island of Bahrain which took place from January
1968 to March 1971 some topics appear intrinsic to the relinquishment of the Iranian claim. 
Having established how these negotiations unfolded, a thematic account will now be employed 
to illustrate varying motivations, considerations, and long-term goals. In reading cables and 
communiqués there are four distinct themes that prove key to a comprehensive analysis of the 
deliberations: the importance of domestic politics and opinion in dictating the course of 
negotiations for the rulers of both Iran and Bahrain — albeit for very different reasons; a 
concern for religious dynamics in both a national and international context; the fate of a 
security network amongst smaller Gulf states as linked to the outcome of the Bahrain 
negotiations; and lastly, the fact that throughout the negotiations the Shah consistently acted 
independently from his political advisers.
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Domestic Politics
Whilst international politics encouraged the Shah to abandon his claim to Bahrain 
publicly in January 1969 it was domestic politics that dictated the ways and means for 
negotiations to occur.109 In critically analyzing the discussions that took place with British 
diplomatic staff it becomes apparent that both Iranian and Bahraini negotiators were motivated 
in their actions by domestic considerations. The rulers of both states were occupied with how 
their populations would react to both the absence of an Iranian claim to Bahrain, and how the 
desired outcome would be achieved. However, whilst the Shah was motivated to provide 
justification for the relinquishment of Iran’s claim and engage with the attitude of the Iranian 
public, the Emir actively sought to stifle the opportunity for public opinion to be expressed. 
Both rulers were greatly concerned with their constituents, but for completely opposing 
reasons.
Beginning in early 1968 the Shah had made it clear to the British Foreign Office in 
private that he remained eager to dispose of the Iranian government’s claim to Bahrain and 
sought a public referendum to satisfy public opinion.110 After the Shah agreed to forgo seeking 
a plebiscite, remarks from the meetings of the British Ambassador to Iran and the Iranian 
Deputy Minister reveal an ongoing concern for appeasing the Iranian public. The latter 
expressed that the then current British proposal to make an enquiry through the United Nations  
would not satisfy public opinion in Iran.111 Throughout the duration of negotiations, the 
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Foreign Office was forced to reposition proposals based on the fact that they did “not really 
provide a sufficient framework within which the Shah can publicly get off the hook of his 
claim to Bahrain”112 which was a non-negotiable prerequisite. 
From the onset of the Shah’s decision to renounce Iran’s longstanding claim, to debates 
over methodology, the Shah was occupied with making sure the Iranian public recognized that 
the matter was a formal legal procedure. Indeed, even after negotiations had been finalized in 
February 1970 the Shah still turned to his trusted childhood friend and advisor,  Asadollah 
Alam, for assurances about public opinion, asking if “between ourselves, do you suppose that 
we are acting as traitors to our country by going ahead with this settlement over Bahrain?”113 
All steps of the Shah’s deliberations over the future of the Bahraini claim reflect deep 
consideration for how the Iranian public would interpret such events. Additionally, it forced 
British diplomats in their shuttle diplomacy to be constantly aware of how to provide sufficient 
justification for the Shah to abandon the historically-rooted claim.114 
During this process the Emir was constantly reflecting over how the public would react to possible 
plans for gauging opinion. From the onset of negotiations in 1968 the ruler of Bahrain was vocal 
about his concern over the introduction of new legislative mechanisms in Bahraini society. As 
noted in correspondence from the British Political Agent in Bahrain the Emir was greatly 
engrossed by what the involvement of the UN in the form of a representative to test opinion 
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might instigate domestically.115 Bahrain had never had any representative institutions, so to 
then to initiate the process of composing electoral rolls and arranging voting procedures as to 
be gauged by a representative of the United Nations could bring unforeseen risks to the 
stability of the territory.116 Even the British Ambassador to Iran acknowledged that Bahrain 
simply had “no means of having a referendum” and the logistics of implementing one would 
be simply unfeasible.117 Whilst there is no documentation of the Emir explicitly stating a desire 
to keep the monarchy secure, in the midst of a period that had seen the overthrow of multiple 
monarchial regimes in the Middle East, one cannot overlook the motivation he had to keep 
ahold of his throne.118 Even the British Political Agent in Bahrain went so far as to comment 
that long-term future of the Emir’s regime was intertwined with the Bahraini-Iranian 
dispute.119
In addition to concern for the monarchy and the introduction of democratic principles 
the Emir was anxious about how encouraging active expression of public opinion might 
instigate violence amongst the split Sunni–Shia population of Bahrain.120 This attitude was not 
limited to the Emir himself. A senior translator at the British Political Agency in Bahrain, a self-
described archetypal middle class Sunni made a comment to the Second Secretary of the 
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Agency in which he stated a similar concern for the delicate social climate saying that he hoped 
nothing like the proposed referendum would ever happen in Bahrain.121 Manama was still 
recovering from a series of bloody religious clashes which had erupted fourteen years prior.122 
Throughout the population of Bahrain there remained lingering feelings of distrust.123 Whilst the Bahraini 
public was not privy to negotiations over a possible plebiscite like this translator, his attitude 
hints at underlying fears of erupting sectarian violence.
The Religious Dimension
The religious component was not only of concern to the Emir during the negotiations 
but also British diplomats who had anxiety about how a plebiscite might play out in Bahrain. 
The British aim in negotiations was not only to help facilitate the ways and means for the Shah 
to relinquish the claim to Bahrain, but to leave stability in the wake of their withdrawal. There 
was still religious tension and also a fear that the Shia community of Bahrain would vote to be 
considered part of Iran out of both dislike and distrust of the Sunni community.124 Such an 
outcome would not be conducive to the Shah abandoning the territorial claim — which he was 
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anxious to do.125 Furthermore, negotiating personnel from London consistently 
articulate a concern for temperament of the Bahraini domestic climate. Over 30 pages 
of diplomatic correspondence reveal concern for how the number of men sent to 
Bahrain to engage with domestic opinion could, depending on the number sent, further 
agitate the social landscape.126
The early stages of negotiation were inexplicably tied to the existing religious 
dynamic. The religious component of Bahraini society could not be ignored, and domestic 
politics remained a key consideration in the ways and means to relinquish Iran’s claim to 
Bahrain. Whilst the Emir of Bahrain was concerned with the domestic religious situation the 
Shah of Iran and the foremost British negotiators were conscious of the broader regional 
climate concerning Shia and Sunni Islam. In the recent years Britain had adopted a strategy of 
balancing Iran and Saudi Arabia — respective bastions of Sunni and Shia Islam in the Middle 
East —against each other to maintain regional stability.127 The same philosophy was behind 
the British desire to create a security network for the smaller states of the Persian Gulf which 
was additionally supported by both the Saudi and Iranian governments.
  The United Arab Emirates
Just as concern for domestic politics cannot be ignored in analyzing the negotiations 
over Iran’s relinquishment of the claim to Bahrain neither can a different political agenda: the 
39
125 Enclosed Note "Bahrain and Iran" of Foreign Office Minute by D.J. McCarthy, "Iran and Bahrain," 10 February
1969, as found in Schofield and Evans, Arabian boundaries: new documents, 9: 300.
126 Despatch No. 4/1 from C.D. Wiggin, Tehran, to D.J. McCarthy, Foreign Office, "Soundings on Opinion in 
Bahrain," 12 February 1969 as found in Schofield and Evans, Arabian boundaries: new documents, 9: 304.
127 Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance the Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2007).
creation of the United Arab Emirates which was established in December 1971. The 
deliberations regarding the Iranian governments territorial claim to Bahrain directly influenced 
the establishment of the federation of emirates, and vice versa.  It is necessary to engage with 
the transforming socio-political dynamics prompted by Egyptian president Gamel Abd al-
Nasser128 to display why the majority of political actors in the Persian Gulf — both small gulf 
states and their more powerful neighbors — viewed the institution of security network as key 
to establishing long-term regional stability.
 In 1952 Nasser assumed power as the result of a coup d’etat which overthrew the 
Egyptian monarchy.129 During his lengthy tenure as President the charismatic leader 
would be a proponent of the non-alignment movement, Arab nationalism, Arab 
socialism, and pan-Arab ideologies with the aim of spreading these anti-colonial 
nationalist philosophies throughout the Arab world.130 Nasser believed that the Arab states 
needed to work together to purge the region from foreign influence. All monarchies of Middle 
East were perceived as a continuation of Western influence, instilled by the West and pawns of 
the West, and thus Nasser sought to replace them with radical republican regimes.131 
The rulers of Iran and Saudi Arabia shared a concern for the spread of revolutionary 
activities in the Persian Gulf as evidenced by examining their joint efforts to counter Nasser’s 
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active participation in the North Yemen Civil War between 1962 and 1970.132 On September 19, 
1962 Imam Ahmad of Yemen died and his son ascended to the throne. Prince Muhammad al-
Badr was proclaimed Imam and King but he did not exercise his newfound powers for long, 
for not even an entire week passed before the commander of the Imam’s bodyguard, 
Abdullah al-Sallal133 launched a coup.134 Yemen was proclaimed a republic with the Council 
of the Revolutionary Command becoming the preceding government.135 Unlike the 
revolutions in Egypt (in 1952) and Iraq (in 1958), the usurped monarch was able to escape 
and it was from this position he was able to rally support amongst the tribes still loyal to the 
monarch with the aim of reclaiming his throne. The divided political climate quickly 
escalated into a full-fledged civil war between supporters of the monarchy and oppositional 
republican forces. The turmoil in Yemen represented for Nasser the opportunity for anti-
monarchial forces to prevail, and a chance to renew his revolutionary credentials.136 In 
pursuit of rapidly centralizing the power of the republican forces Nasser quickly dispatched 
both men and materiel to the leaders of the newly proclaimed Yemen Arab Republic. At the 
height of Egyptian involvement there were over 70,000 members of the Egyptian 
Expeditionary Force fighting on behalf of the new republican regime and this support 
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would continue until 1967.137
 Egypt was not the only country supporting factions in Yemen. In the past Nasser had 
sponsored efforts in Saudi Arabia and Jordan to undermine the standing monarchies of the 
Middle East, and these countries remained wary of what effect the spread of revolutionary 
uprisings might have on their own regimes.138 For however long there was a radical republican 
government on Saudi Arabia’s border there remained a threat to the security of the throne. Thus, 
as Nasser armed al-Sallal’s republican forces Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal (r. 1964 -1975)139 began 
to channel both money and weapons to those loyal to the Yemeni monarch with the hope of 
having his throne restored.140 Iran additionally sponsored royalist activity on and off during the 
civil war. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia was motivated by concern for the security of his rule, and 
the Shah was driven by a fear of the spread of Arab nationalism for Iran was not an Arab state. Egypt 
was, therefore, a common enemy for both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Whilst limited in their 
cooperation, they both aimed to curb pan-Arabism and prevent political instability in the region.
 The fear of a regional political vacuum was exacerbated the British Prime Minister’s 
announcement in January 1968 that by 1971 United Kingdom was to withdraw all of its troops 
from the Persian Gulf. Historians disagree on one specific explanation of the decision citing the 
paradigm of domestic politics, a desire to focus on Europe as opposed to the empire, domestic 
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institutional inertia, and maintaining party unity as possible causes.141 William Roger Louis argues that 
the British left the Gulf as part of a broader plan to limit spending to rescue the British economy.142 The British 
pound had been recently devalued from $2.80 to $2.40, and ending the presence of troops east of 
Suez was viewed as a way to cut government spending.143 Despite varying historical 
interpretations, the declaration was made and the plan of policy was adhered to. Following the 
British decision to “withdraw” from the Gulf one question remained: what was to be the fate of 
the trucial states?144 British forces were not only serving as protection for national oil interests 
but also aiming to maintain general stability.145 
  For nearly a century states in the Persian Gulf had been protectorates of the United 
Kingdom. The emirates themselves feared the leave of the British as but an opportunity for 
greater powers of the region to vie for political dominance in their territory. On separate 
occasions the sheikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dubai contacted the Foreign Office offering to fund 
the cost of having British troops remain in the region.146 However, due to disputes amongst the 
British Labour Party and domestic economic difficulties the Secretary of State for Defense 
declined. What then was to be course of action upon formal British disengagement from the 
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region? The United Kingdom wanted to preserve their respective interests, and saw a solution 
in the established independence of Bahrain and Qatar, and their joint membership in a newly 
created federation which would include the seven trucial states.147
The British desire for this union was motivated by the belief a formal federation would 
counter competing quests for dominance in the Persian Gulf — namely between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran. After the Six Day War the Foreign Office no longer perceived Egypt as its greatest 
threat, but rather by a possible rivalry for regional dominance between Riyadh and Tehran.148 
The creation of a federation of the seven trucial states, Bahrain and Qatar would therefore be 
an assurance to the stability of the Gulf and British oil interests.149 The British were motivated 
to be instigators and facilitators in the process of Iran relinquishing the claim to Bahrain 
because its status determined the fate of regional stability. The hope of generating an outcome 
favorable to their own interest motivated the United Kingdom to play such an active role in the 
negotiations over territory in the Persian Gulf.
Despite the Foreign Office’s belief that Saudi Arabia would utilize British withdrawal 
as a chance to further assert her own interest, the Saudi King viewed the decision with 
similar disdain to the Sheikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. He remarked to Herman Eilts, the  
American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, of his anxiety concerning British disengagement and 
“railed against [the] Labour government’s ‘irresponsibility.’”150 Once it appeared that the 
British stance could not be swayed, Faisal embraced the notion of a federation in its 
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embryonic stage and continued to support it in the years following. In an interview with the 
New York Times in May 1968 the King remarked that there was no need for a political 
vacuum with anticipated British departure.151 Faisal viewed Arab socialism espoused by 
Nasser as of the utmost threat to the stability of his rule for it sought the fall of all monarchies in the 
region.  The creation of the federation of Arab emirates would therefore limit the Gulf states 
individual susceptibility to these external threats, and as a result King Faisal became an 
active proponent of the federation that would become the United Arab Emirates.
Iran could not recognize or support a union as it was originally proposed by the rulers 
of the seven trucial states of Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Sharjah, Umm al-Quwain, Ras al-
Khaimah, and Fujairah, in conjunction with Bahrain and Qatar.152 The reason for this was 
because amongst those wanting to create an Arab federation was Bahrain — who, as detailed 
earlier, Iran viewed as an Iranian province. However, the Iranian objection to the 
establishment of what would become the United Arab Emirates should not be construed as a 
complaint against the institution of such a security network in the Gulf. Rather, the Shah 
viewed it of the utmost importance such a framework exist to limit the ability of other 
regional powers to gain influence.153 The small states of the Gulf, whilst wealthy as a result 
of oil and mineral concessions, did not have the resources to protect themselves from the 
military might of their larger neighbors. However, the formation of such a political 
confederation was remained unacceptable to Iran, as long as their claim to Bahrain was 
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undisposed of.154 
 With a united stance against the spread of Nasser’s political ideologies King Faisal of 
Saudi Arabia and the Shah of Iran sought to create a regional security network for the emirates of 
the Gulf. Whilst following the Six-Day War Nasser’s diminished reputation and power was 
recognized, there was still fear of a political vacuum.155 Additionally, the Shah was becoming 
increasingly concerned with Iraq’s aggressive regional ambitions.156 The creation of such a 
federation would prevent both the spread of Nasserism and the further subversion of monarchial 
regimes. Additionally, it would maintain security of smaller Gulf states who were not 
individually capable of protecting themselves. Throughout the duration of the negotiations, the 
fate of Iran’s claim to Bahrain appears to be intimately intertwined with the establishment of 
what would be the United Arab Emirates.
The Shah: An Independent Actor?
In thematically illustrating the negotiations over Bahrain which took place between 
January 1968 and March 1970 there is one last point that cannot be ignored; namely, the Shah 
as a politician independent of his advisers. As established in the first thematic deconstruction 
the Shah was greatly constrained in his decision-making by his regard for domestic opinion of 
his actions. However, when it came to decision-making amongst those holding office the Shah 
repeatedly acted autonomously, often taking a different stance than his advisers and foreign 
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ministers. Diplomatic cables serve as evidence, as in one episode where after the Shah had 
publicly committed himself to abandoning the Iranian claim to Bahrain the Iranian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs heatedly objected, contending that Bahrain was as much a part of Iran as 
Surrey was of England.157 Multiple high level diplomatic officials did not wish for the Shah to 
succeed with relinquishing the Iranian claim. The Shah’s commitment to disposal shows that during 
this time he was a figure crafting policy alone and not giving in to the political wishes of others. His 
decision making process, as argued by Roham Alvandi who is the only scholar to analyze the 
Bahrain negotiations, reflects an ability not to be hindered by the opinions of his upper level 
officials.158
The notion of the Shah acting independently throughout the Bahrain negotiations is 
supported when examining the circle of those involved in the deliberations. Whilst the decision 
to abandon the Iranian claim to Bahrain was initially the Shah and the Shah’s alone, following 
that commitment there was the opportunity to widen the circle of those involved. However, an 
entire year after this pledge Abbas Aram, the Iranian Ambassador to the United Kingdom, had 
been kept in the dark by his own government and did not know of any developments regarding 
Bahrain. At this point the Shah had resolved to both forgo a plebiscite and to explore 
international options.159
In analyzing hundreds of diplomatic cables exchanged between the British Resident in 
the Gulf and members of various British embassies in the region it is repeatedly expressed that 
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personnel should have a complete disregard for the comments of high-level Iranian officials.  
In March 1969 the Shah embarked on his annual holiday to go skiing in Switzerland with his 
family. Soon after he departed from Tehran a prominent state official made a comment in a 
meeting with British diplomats and stated that Iran might consider physical action to reinforce 
that Bahrain was formally part of Iran.160 The British diplomatic authorities in Tehran gave his 
words little consideration. A high-level member of the British Foreign Office commented that 
“what matters is exchanges with the Shah and not the various moves of Iranian officials”161 
suggesting that the comments of Iranian officials could almost be disregarded wholeheartedly. 
 Over time the Foreign Office eventually came to the conclusion that it was only 
conversations with the Shah that truly mattered.162 These episodes highlight how whilst the 
Shah was at all times thinking about how the Iranian people would perceive his actions, he 
repeatedly acted independently from his most prominent political advisers whose opinions 
diverged from his own.163
Concluding Remarks
 In this chapter a thematic approach illustrated the importance of domestic politics and 
public opinion to both the Shah of Iran and the Emir of Bahrain in contrasting ways. 
Throughout the duration of the negotiations over the disposal of the historically-rooted claim 
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the Shah had a high regard for public opinion and was conscious of gauging their perception. 
This contrasts greatly to the Emir’s aim to limit the opportunities for it to be expressed. 
Additionally, it has been shown that throughout the deliberations there was an overwhelming 
concern for religious dynamics and how changes might instigate chaos in Bahrain. British 
diplomats at all levels were also conscious of the dynamic between Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
Additionally, the negotiations reveal how the fate of the security network that would become 
the United Arab Emirates could not be separated from the fate of an independent Bahrain. 
Lastly, this deconstructed account illustrated how whilst constrained by public opinion the Shah 
acted independently from his political advisors. 
Bahrain declared independence in 1971, but this was not the only territorial change in 
the Gulf. Due to an agreement with the ruler of what is now the Emirate of Sharjah Iran was 
granted the northern half of the island of Abu Masa. At this time the Shah also requisitioned 
the islands of Greater Tunbs and Lesser Tunbs. On the eve of British retreat from the Persian 
Gulf the Shah laid claim to new territory after denouncing ties to Bahrain, which leaves room 
for speculation regarding what may have occurred behind closed doors between the British 
Prime Minister’s announcement of future withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, and physical 
withdrawal in 1971. The following chapter aims to engage with the existent historical 
evidence concerning a deal crafted between diplomatic authorities of Tehran and London 
concerning the islands of Abu Masa, Greater Tunbs, and Lesser Tunbs.
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“After all, it was not often that countries gave up claims, however unjustified, 
and it was bound to occur to the Iranians sooner or later that they might get 
something out of the renunciation of their claim to Bahrain if they carried it through.”164
– Geoffrey George Arthur
   British Foreign Service Officer
   1969
Chapter 3: Deal or No Deal
Introductory Remarks 
 The British Prime Minister’s January 1968 announcement of intent to withdraw all 
British troops from Aden to Singapore signaled the disintegration of the informal British Empire. 
Sir Geoffrey Arthur was the last appointed Political Resident in the Persian Gulf on behalf of the 
United Kingdom and on December 19, 1971 following years of negotiations over the Shah’s 
historically-rooted claim to Bahrain he illustrated for Foreign Secretary Lord Home the scene 
before him of the HMS Achilles and HMS Intrepid departing from the port of Bahrain. “There 
was no ceremony as the last British fighting unit withdrew from the Persian Gulf,” he wrote, “a 
British merchant vessel in the opposite berth blew her siren, and Intrepid’s lone piper, scarcely 
audible above the bustle of the port, played what sounded like some Gaelic lament. That was 
all.”165 But that was not all. The last few days of formal British presence in the Persian Gulf in 
the 1970s was not without additional territorial changes excluding Bahrain.
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 Nineteen days prior, on November 30 1971 Iranian forces landed on both the Greater 
Tunbs and Lesser Tunbs islands in addition to the northern part of Abu Masa.166 On the Tunbs 
islands, the takeover was neither peaceful nor welcomed as rioting broke out. Inhabitants were 
shipped on fishing boats off the island, and seven people were killed in the outbreak of 
hostilities.167 There was still another sunrise till Britain’s protective treaty with the islands 
expired, yet Britain did not respond to Iranian forces occupying the Tunbs. As explored earlier in 
this historical analysis of the region, the Shah had publicly committed himself to relinquishing 
the Iranian claim to Bahrain with British departure from the Gulf. The fact remains that on the 
eve of British retreat from the region Iran laid claim to new territory after denouncing formal ties 
to Bahrain. Was Iran’s occupation of the Tunbs islands therefore part of a pre-established 
agreement? This chapter argues that despite discussions of a deal in the early stages of the 
negotiations, there is not enough evidence to suggest the Iranian troops occupation in late 1971 
was the result of such a quid pro quo agreement.168
The Islands: A Geographical and Historical Evaluation 
    The islands of Abu Masa, Greater Tunbs and Lesser Tunbs are located in the main sea 
lane for entering and exiting the Persian Gulf at the Sea of Hormuz. Greater Tunbs is located just 
30 miles from the Iranian port of Lingeh, and 40 miles from what is now the Emirate of Ras al-
Khaimah.169 The geography of the island is perhaps best described by its name, which in the 
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Persian dialect spoken in southern Iran closest to the coast translates to “hill.” A tiny territory, it 
is estimated that in 1970 approximately 150 Arabs lived on the island of Greater Tunb.170 
Meanwhile, the completely uninhabitable Lesser Tunbs lies just eight miles southwest.171 A little 
further off the coast of Lingeh one will find Abu Masa with its rich fertile soils. The three islands 
share a strategic geographical location but when considering territorial changes in 1971 in the 
Persian Gulf they cannot be evaluated equally. 
 The reason for this lies in the fact that there was a legal agreement allowing for the Shah 
to annex the northern part of Abu Masa. In November 1971 the ruler of Sharjah, a trucial state, 
and Mohammad Reza Shah signed an accord known as the Memorandum of Understanding, 
which formally detailed jurisdiction for the island of Abu Masa. Prior to 1971, the United 
Kingdom conducted diplomacy on behalf of the ruler of Sharjah for which it had a protective 
treaty with reaching back to the 1880s.172 In anticipation of British withdrawal, the new 
agreement created a fresh system of authority in which both the ruler of Sharjah and the Shah 
would have joint, yet separate, administration over Abu Masa. Neither would recognize the claim 
of sovereignty made by the other in which it was argued the island was respectively Arab or 
Persian. Instead, based on agreed areas of occupation (Iran the northern half of the island, and 
Sharjah the southern half of the island), each would have complete jurisdiction to bear their own 
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flag, fish the island, and the right to a set division of energy resources.173 Indeed, when Iran’s 
forces arrived to Abu Masa in late November the ruler of Sharjah’s brother welcomed the troops 
himself.174
 With the Memorandum of Understanding legitimizing partial Iranian authority on the 
island and allowing for an influx of Iranian forces Abu Masa is therefore differentiated from the 
Tunbs where there was no similar agreement made between the ruler of what is now the Emirate 
of Ras al-Khaimah and the Shah. Yet, on the same day Iranian forces arrived on Abu Masa they 
occupied the Tunbs islands; sending all inhabitants back to Ras al-Khaimah on small fishing 
boats with outcry from the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah himself.175 However, was this supplemental 
seizure given the green light by London in exchange for the Shah abandoning the historically-
rooted claim to Bahrain the Foreign Office so desired?
 I contend that there is not enough evidence to suggest that territorial changes in 
November 1971 in the Persian Gulf were the product of a packaged agreement. However, this 
does not make such an inquiry irrelevant. Rather, my findings contribute to the historiography of 
the event, and discredit the argument that the Iranian officials believed they had secured the 
islands was without a valid foundation. In conducting such an investigation I reviewed hundreds 
of diplomatic telegrams, communiqués, memorandums, and briefings as exchanged by British 
diplomatic personnel in the region at the time.176 Furthermore, I have examined Iranian memoirs, 
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and the limited academic work done on the subject of Greater Tunbs and Lesser Tunbs.  Contrary 
to the common scholarly opinion, I assert that at one point the British Foreign Office did suggest 
a packaged settlement offer, but by 1971 this offer was not still part of the negotiating process 
nor was it ever formalized. 
Evidence of a Deal
 Whilst researching the diplomacy that led to the relinquishment of the longstanding 
Iranian claim to Bahrain I founded repeated references to a possible deal in both Iranian and 
British sources. For example, early memorandums from the Foreign Office forecasted what was 
to occur with formal British departure from the Persian Gulf and this should not be immediately 
dismissed as coincidence.  Sir Denis Wright, British Ambassador to Iran, commented in a 
meeting in March 1968 that he believed the Shah “would go for the islands as soon as we left”177 
and his prediction three years later became the status quo. Ambassador Wright’s foresight does 
not imply a legal agreement of any kind, but his view is mirrored in Iranian sources which makes 
one question what exactly was going on behind closed doors. 
 The Shah’s most trusted confidant, Asadollah Alam, recorded the day-to-day events of the 
Iranian court in a diary that was published posthumously. In his journal I found clear indications 
of a possible deal. Alam writes that the British Ambassador had hinted that if the Shah was to 
back the creation of a federation of the Emirates Iran might be called upon to occupy islands in 
54
177 Alvandi, "Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Bahrain Question."
the Gulf.178 Similarly, he documented the Shah was “sure he’d bagged the islands” following his 
declaration to allow the people of Bahrain to decide their own destiny in January 1969.179
 Whilst I contend the territorial changes in November 1971 were not the product of a 
settlement deal between the Shah and British diplomats, this does not mean there was never a 
possible deal. Rather, between spring of 1968 and autumn of 1969 negotiators in both Tehran and 
London were giving serious consideration for a packaged agreement. Published archival material 
retrospectively acknowledges a standing packaged deal in which Bahraini independence was 
linked to Abu Masa and the Tunbs.180 In examining wires from the British Residency in Bahrain 
to the Arabian Department of the Foreign Office in London there are repeated references to this 
agreement. One high-level staffer wrote to another contemplating what might happen if 
negotiators decided to revive the idea of a packaged deal.181 To “revive” the concept indicates 
that at one point such a bargain was actively being considered. The prior existence of a deal is 
supported by diplomatic briefs articulating a similar possibility of recreating a joint settlement in 
the same fashion to that which had been conceived the year before.182 With statements such as 
“when we put forward our package proposal last year” one cannot dispute that at one point a 
quid pro quo exchange at the negotiating table.183 However, discussions of a deal before 1971 are 
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not evidence of a settlement justifying the arrival of Iranian troops at the Tunbs in November 
1971.
   Rather, during the negotiations British diplomats concluded that it would be easier to 
reach a solution regarding the islands of Abu Masa, Greater Tunbs, and Lesser Tunbs once the 
Iranian claim to Bahrain had been disposed of.184 By April 1969 the Foreign Office was actively 
resisting any linking between Bahrain and the other islands, and representatives of the Foreign 
Office were consistent in expressing to the Shah and Iranian negotiators that they could not 
consider a package deal and the Shah should look to pursuing individual agreements with the 
rulers of Sharjah and Ras-al-Khaimah independently.185 As succinctly noted by a British official 
in correspondence: “it is not for us to tell one ruler that he should give up part of his territory to 
benefit another.”186 The evidence suggests that the Foreign Office originally proposed a 
packaged deal in 1968 that was never formally agreed upon. By the following year, British 
diplomats were treating the issue of the islands and Bahrain separately. Archival material does 
provide proof of a deal, but more than a year before Iran moved to station troops to the Tunbs 
islands British officials were rejecting any sort of settlement. 
56
184 Foreign Office minute by G.G. Arthur, 2 April 1969 as found in Schofield and Evans, Arabian boundaries: new 
documents, 9: 358.
185 Ibid, and Minutes from J.A.N. Graham to A.A. Acland, 29 April 1969, and from D.J. McCarthy to J.A.N. 
Graham, 30 April 1969 as found in Schofield and Evans, Arabian boundaries: new documents, 9: 389.
186 Papers entitled "Iranian Claims in the Persian Gulf: Bahrain, Abu Musa, and the Tunbs: Talking Points" and 
"Iranian Claims in the Persian Gulf: Bahrain, Abu Musa and the Tunbs: Background Brief," undated, received in 
Registry 13 May 1969 as found in Schofield and Evans, Arabian boundaries: new documents, 9: 399.
A Failure to Protect
 If one accepts the evidence that the Foreign Office did not authorize the Iranian 
occupation of islands in exchange for the Shah relinquishing the historically-rooted claim to 
Bahrain then why did London not uphold its agreement to protect the islands? Beginning in early 
1968 the British government explored both diplomatic and military means to solve the territorial 
disputes over the islands in the Persian Gulf. Time and money went into crafting contingency 
plans for the event of an Iranian seizure of the Tunbs. Known by the codename of PENSUM, if 
Iran was to seize Greater Tunbs and Lesser Tunbs British forces would occupy Abu Masa. 
Additionally, there two other contingency plans known as PAMPERO and BUDLET/
ACCOLL.187 Despite such plans London pursued no such path to counter Iran’s actions. 
 Correspondence illustrates that the Foreign Office was aiming to “implement a policy of 
deterrence through bluff” and despite the institution of contingency plans London was not 
committed to using force. One Foreign Office official stated retrospectively in an interview that 
British diplomats had done their best to help the Shah achieve negotiated settlements and even 
going so far as to suggest the outright Iranian purchase of the Tunbs islands by the Shah. The 
Foreign Office even explored the possibility of a three-way bargain in which the Sirri Island 
would be awarded to Iran, Abu Musa awarded to the Sharjah, and the sale of the Tunbs of Iran.188
  Whilst diplomatic resolve was achieved with the ruler of Abu Masa no agreement was 
reached regarding the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah concerning the Tunbs islands.Without forces 
stationed the British government could not continue its treaty to protect the islands.189 Some 
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diplomatic personnel were vehemently in favor of military action, but in the midst of general 
withdrawal from the region and a broader plan for British extraction from extraneous obligations, 
the Foreign Office would not act to save two islands; one of which entirely uninhabitable.190
 Such a failure to act is not an indication of a deal but rather the product of realist policies 
pursued by the British diplomats. Furthermore, if the Iranian occupation was but a pre-
coordinated exercise like that which culminated in the relinquishment of the historically rooted 
claim it would be similarly documented. Arabian Boundaries: New Documents, 1966-1975 is 
comprised of all British diplomatic correspondence concerning territorial changes in the Persian 
Gulf region. Memorandums and briefings from early on in the negotiations explicitly refer to a 
deal and the failure of the deal to actually manifest. If in fact a deal had been agreed upon for 
November 1971 when Iran sent troops to the Tunbs islands, there would have been references to 
the Foreign Office’s consent.
Historiography
 In analyzing the evolution of the debate over a possible quid pro quo exchange of 
territory between Iran and the United Kingdom over the Greater Tunbs, Lesser Tunbs, and 
Bahrain, most scholarly analysis fails to acknowledge that one time this exchange was an 
integral part of London’s negotiating strategy. Whilst I have concluded that no deal was 
formalized, when it is portrayed in other works it is solely Iranian diplomatic personnel who are 
trying to orchestrate a deal. This has no doubt slanted a comprehensive understanding of events 
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and the possibility of British support for an exchange of territory has not been given due 
credence.
 Beyond ignoring the substantial consideration British officials gave to a packaged deal 
regarding Bahrain and the islands, historiography also fails to acknowledge the regional belief 
that a deal was crafted. Immediately following Iranian troops landing on the Tunbs islands 
rumors began circulating that the British government had made an agreement with the ruler of 
Ras Al-Khaimah in which the Shah could seize the Tunbs islands.191 In Baghdad the seizure of 
the islands was perceived as yet another British betrayal for the Foreign Office was still 
responsible for their protection.192 Similarly in Libya, the second most prominent government 
official193 articulated that “Britain bore responsibility for defending the islands. If Britain did not 
react to the Iranian occupation, this would proof positive in Libyan eyes that it had taken place 
with British connivance.”194 Deal or no deal, it was perceived as the former and with Sheikh 
Saqr, the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah looking to take the issue to both the Arab League and the 
United Nations Security Council it was seemingly a debate that was not going away anytime 
soon.195
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Concluding Remarks 
 The British government was formally obligated to protect the islands, yet it did not act in 
November 1971. Prior to this date the Foreign Office had been active in pursuing a diplomatic 
solution to the known dispute over the Greater and Lesser Tunbs. With Abu Masa, diplomacy 
had been successful when the rulers agreed to postpone a formal clause stating whether the 
island was indeed Arab or Persian from the Memorandum of Understanding.196 In regards to the 
Greater and Lesser Tunbs, negotiations between the Ruler of Ras Al-Khaimah and the Shah did 
not culminate in a similar treaty despite encouragement from the Foreign Office. Whilst not 
reacting to Iranian’s seizure of the islands, there is no concrete evidence suggesting a deal. 
Between 1968 and 1971 there were multiple discussions amongst British and Iranian negotiators 
regarding a quid pro quo exchange of territory, which is often ignored.  The existence of such 
talks is not proof that these discussions were the premise for Iranian troops seizing the Tunbs 
without approval in 1971. Since then the seizure of the Tunbs by Iranian forces continues to be 
regarded by the United Arab Emirates as an “occupation.”197 The following chapter will examine 
how the Iranian claims to Abu Masa and the Tunbs continue to impact its relations with its 
neighbors, and how even Iran’s abandoned claim to Bahrain has had significant repercussions on 
the domestic politics of Bahrain.
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 “The principal demand of the Bahraini people today is to return this province, 
which was separated from Iran, to its mother, Islamic Iran.”198
– Hossein Shariatmadari 
   Editor-in-Chief of Kayhan
   2007
Chapter 4: Enduring Relevance
Introductory Remarks
 During the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi the Iranian state repeatedly expressed legal 
jurisdiction over Bahrain.199 Negotiations beginning in 1968 formally abandoned the Iranian 
claim to the island, but nearly 45 years after Iran’s approach to the United Nations Secretary-
General the Iranian connection remains relevant. This is evident when examining the current 
Iranian political discourse concerned with annexing Bahrain. This inquiry then turns to 
evaluating Bahrain’s domestic policies where through embracing the lens of monarchial 
considerations one is a witness to the evolving strategies of the ruling family. In 1999 the Emir of 
Bahrain200 was succeeded by his son, Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifah (r. 1999 - present)201 and their 
treatment of domestic religious demographics is intricately tied in with the notion of an Iranian 
claim to Bahrain. 
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 Just as the relationship between Tehran and Manama remains strained, the relationship 
between the United Arab Emirates and Iran is uneasy as a result of Iran’s continued contention 
that it has sovereignty over the islands of Abu Masa, Greater Tunbs, and Lesser Tunbs. The 
governments of Iran and the UAE have consistently asserted that each possesses rightful 
sovereignty over the near-uninhabitable but strategically significant islands. The gravity of the 
disagreement is found in the fact that the question of legal jurisdiction over the islands has made 
it onto the agenda of not only regional but also international political summits. Iran continues to 
contend that three islands in the Gulf are rightfully Iranian despite their function as a source of 
extreme dispute with Iran’s neighbors. As a result, the islands have grown to take on an 
importance beyond their geographically strategic value.
Annexing Bahrain
 Despite formal relinquishment in 1971, the notion of Bahrain as an Iranian province has 
remained prevalent in Iranian political discourse. The first time the claim arose following the 
1968-1971 negotiations was in the midst of the Islamic Revolution in 1979.202 In an aim to 
export the revolution which had ousted the Shah, Ayatollah Sadeq Rouhani203 called for the 
Islamic Republic to annex Bahrain if the Emir of Bahrain did not adopt a similar model of 
Islamic governance.204 Whilst this was not a statement of the formal Foreign Ministry of the 
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Islamic Republic, nor the opinion of Ayatollah Khomeini, the foremost leader of the Islamic 
Revolution, the cry for such action reveals that a reassertion of Iran’s territorial claim was not out 
of the question in 1979. 
 Possible annexation has been legitimized by more contemporary discourse in the Iranian 
political sphere.  In 2007 an editorial by the editor-in-chief of Kayhan, an Iranian daily, stirred 
Iran-Bahrain relations. Hossein Shariatmadari wrote that:
Bahrain is part of Iran's soil, having been separated from it through an 
illegal conspiracy [spawned] by... Shah [Pahlavi, in conjunction with] the 
American and British governments. The principal demand of the Bahraini 
people today is to return this province, which was separated from Iran, to 
its mother, Islamic Iran.205 
Shariatmadari also formally serves as a representative of Supreme Leader Ali Husseini 
Khamenei, so his claims that Bahrain was an inseparable part of Iran triggered Bahraini anxiety 
about future action of the Iranian government. Whilst the situation was tempered through 
diplomatic back channels and espousing that Shariatmadari’s editorial was a personal view, and 
not that of the government of Iran, tensions flared again in 2012.206 Kayhan printed another 
editorial claiming that the Islamic Republic maintains the right to return Bahrain, a separated 
province, to Iran. Furthermore, the editorial contended that Bahrainis consider themselves 
Iranians, and that reports indicated they were eager to formally return to Iran.207 
 One might contend that such statements are simply rhetorical and do not reflect an actual 
threat of annexation. However, the fact that this is a sentiment repeatedly expressed shows that 
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the historic claim to Bahrain is something to be tapped into, and something not entirely of the 
past, but of the present. 
Then and Now: Monarchial Strategies of the Al-Khalifah Family 
 The contemporary relevance of Iran’s historically-rooted claim to Bahrain is also 
apparent when examining contemporary politics of the Persian Gulf. The historical negotiations 
provide a window to the geopolitical considerations of the Emir of Bahrain and the Shah of Iran. 
The depth of insight available reveals that since the negotiations there has been a dramatic 
change in monarchial strategies in Bahrain. The policies pursued by the Emir in the earlier 
negotiations vary considerably from his son, King Hamad, during the 2011 uprising in Bahrain. 
Both sought to preserve the security of the monarchy, but aimed to achieve this in completely 
contrasting manners.
 During the deliberations over Iran’s claim to Bahrain, the former Emir continuously 
objected to the Iranian suggestion of a plebiscite on the basis it would trigger the escalation of 
domestic religious tensions.208  The outcome of the negotiations over the claim to Bahrain were 
directly tied to the security of the monarchy,209 and the Sunni ruler knew the memories of the 
1953-1954 Sunni-Shia riots remained vivid and sought to avoid a public referendum that may 
have led to exacerbating religious tensions.210 The Emir viewed religious dissent as something 
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that would prove harmful to both the Bahraini independence movement and the durability of his 
regime.
 In contrast his son King Hamad, who came to power in 1999, viewed the exacerbation of 
religious tensions as key to maintaining the stability of his rule. This is most evident in the 
policies pursued during the 2011 demonstrations in Bahrain for social, economic, and 
governmental reform. That January, a wave a political upheaval swept across the Middle East as 
a response to the self-immolation of Mohamad Bouazizi on the streets of Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia. 
Across the region demands for societal change were espoused and demonstrations broke out in 
Oman, Yemen, Egypt, Syria, and Morocco. Whilst thousands were in Tahrir Square in Cairo 
voicing their desire for the resignation of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, social media 
platforms were beginning to be utilized in Bahrain to call for similar protests with an aim of 
transforming civil society.
 The first days of demonstrations in Bahrain in February, 2011 were confined to remote 
Shia communities, but the demonstrations as a whole were not limited to the Shia population.211 
In late February, members of the Shia majority were leading the majority of protests but the 
desire for systemic change was widespread and increased as a response to the outbreak of police 
brutality and numerous deaths at the hands of Bahraini security forces. A probe into the 2011 
protests sponsored by King Hamad himself would later report both Sunni and Shia Bahrainis 
were involved in the protests.212 The report itself acknowledges the participation of Sunni actors, 
and is proof of demonstrations not being limited to the Shia population of Bahrain. This is 
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further evidenced when analyzing the protests themselves during which the people chanted that 
they were not Sunnis or Shias, but only Bahrainis.213 There was a united desire for a greater 
democratic process and economic opportunity domestically. However, it would be careless to 
contend that all were in favor of such political changes, and many Sunnis at the outbreak of 
demonstrations were dismissive of protestors.214 Despite varying opinions, in late February 2011 
it is estimated that one out of every six Bahraini citizens were protesting in Manama.215
 The domestic religious dynamic was utilized by King Hamad to solidify his position 
domestically which was threatened by political demonstrations. In January Ben Ali, the President 
of Tunisia, had been ousted; marking the first time widespread public protests had usurped an 
Arab leader.216 Similarly, in February, President Hosni Mubarak who had ruled Egypt for three 
decades resigned — surrendering to the thousands of protestors who had demanded he abandon 
his post.217 Those protesting in Tunisia and Egypt had not only demonstrated against high levels 
of unemployment, lack of democratic processes, and limited opportunities but also for the 
departure of their authoritarian rulers. When protests began in Bahrain, King Hamad was fearful 
of the security of his regime, and he exploited the religious dynamic in order to maintain power.
 The different status of Sunni and Shia Bahrainis is evident when analyzing Bahraini 
society itself.  The first Bahraini census was conducted in 1941 and revealed that the Shia 
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population made up 53 per cent of the entire population.218 Since then, the Shia population has 
grown exponentially and according to a 2010 census 75 per cent of the country’s population 
subscribes to Shia Islam.219 There are entire cities in Bahrain such as Riffa, the second largest in 
the Kingdom of Bahrain with a population of over 110,000, in which Shias are not allowed to 
rent homes or purchase land. Any Sunnis with Iranian ancestry are also prohibited from living in 
the area.220 Furthermore, any Bahraini who falls into either of those two categories is not allowed 
to hold a position in the police or armed forces. Employment is a serious issue for the Shia 
population of Bahrain for the country’s largest employer is the Ministry of Interior and thus the 
Shia population is limited in its socio-economic opportunities.221 Political representation is 
further restricted by procedural politics, and the country has been divided into imbalanced 
sectarian constituencies. As one global report concluded: “in the southern governorate, which the 
many newly naturalized persons reside, a block of around 2000 voters hold a seat in parliament, 
whilst in the central and northern governorates, that are majority Shiite areas, block of around 
7800 voters hold one.”222    
 Despite varied living experiences, the demonstrations that began in 2011 cannot be 
explained by religion. It was strategic action by King Hamad which transformed the character of 
turbulence in Bahrain into a sectarian issue. Protestors subscribing to both Sunni and Shia Islam 
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were camped out in Pearl Square to demonstrate against the regime and in favor of democratic 
reform.223  Al Wefaq, the largest political group 224 in Bahrain and also a Shia political group, 
expressed during the protests that their actions were additionally fueled by the Shia population 
“suffer[ing] systematic discrimination at the hands of the Sunni dynasty ruling Bahrain.”225 
Overarching demands, however, mirrored those of protestors in Bahrain’s neighboring countries: 
a desire for reform under monarchial rule. The demonstrations in early 2011 represent the 
discriminatory, not sectarian, nature of Bahraini society.226 However, after February 2011 the 
nature of discord was altered.
 Following the outbreak of dissent, King Hamad aimed to break the unity of the original 
movement through playing up religious tensions.227 Through drawing attention to and 
perpetuating rhetoric of religious difference he managed to divert attention away from his regime 
and on to the Shia population of Bahrain. As highlighted by Gregory Gause228 in a report for the 
Brookings Doha Center, the original situation itself was not sectarian, but was transformed by 
the regime into oppositional religious violence.229  Through highlighting the historically 
grounded claim to Bahrain and Iran’s alleged influence on the Bahraini Shia community, the 
religious situation was exploited to maintain the security of the monarchy. Domestic turmoil was 
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both externalized in the Iranian connection to Bahrain, and internalized in the domestic Shia 
population. 
 In early March increasing numbers of people took to the streets. Whilst more radical Shia 
political groups wanted the abdication of the monarchy, the largest political party in Bahrain230
wanted to establish a constitutional monarchy.231 In the first month of protests many had been 
killed, and hundreds had been injured from acts of police brutality which included firing live 
rounds on thousands of protestors who had been marching.232 With increasingly violent clashes 
between security forces and demonstrators, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) announced that 
it would, for the first time, authorize collective military action to suppress popular revolt.233 On 
March 14 nearly 1,500 GCC troops entered Bahrain. 
 The alleged close link between the Bahraini people and the Iran allowed for King Hamad 
to utilize sectarian divisions to sustain the ruling power structure.234 King Hamad justified 
outside intervention with the argument that the Bahraini uprising was the result of foreign 
(Iranian) intervention in Bahrain’s domestic politics.235   The Shia population of Bahrain has long 
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been viewed by the Bahraini government as a “potential Iranian fifth column”236 ― an attitude 
that has its origins in the discovery of coup plot backed by the Islamic Republic after the fall of 
the Shah.237 This stated mission of the GCC forces was not only to support King Hamad’s 
government against its domestic challengers but also, specifically, to deter Iran’s participation.238 
In response to such outside intervention on the following day thousands of Bahrainis took to the 
streets of Manama and protested in front of the Saudi embassy.239  The demonstrations turned 
violent with over 200 people injured and two killed.240 With the onset of increasing violence 
King Hamad thus presented himself and the greater monarchy as not only a stabilizing force, but 
as the protector of the Sunni community from the Shia majority.241 He enacted a State of 
National Safety242 and authorized excessive use of force to put down protests. King Hamad 
justified his position both through citing a threat to national security and playing up social 
divisions. As a result he was able to prevent a cross-sectarian opposition front and diffuse unified 
demands for reform.243
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 Original demonstrations acted as a catalyst for deflecting social problems away from the 
monarchy and onto the Shia population of Bahrain; which has continued to this day. King Hamad 
has contended since February 2011 that the political activities of the Shia community of Bahrain 
is a threat to the national security of Bahrain and has employed a $32 million dollar public 
relations campaign to persuade the public of this.244 Yet, there was no credible evidence in 2011 
that Iran played a part in Bahrain’s uprising.245 The autumn after protests first broke out King 
Hamad established an independent commission to look into the origins of the uprising and 
examine how reconciliation might occur. The investigation was chaired by Mahmoud Cherif 
Bassiouni246 and despite the links between the Commission of Inquiry and King Hamad no proof 
of an Iranian connection was found in the formal report.247
 At the time of this analysis in 2015 there have not been any new empirical links made 
between Iran and the Shia community in Bahrain.248  It was this original claim of Iranian 
interference in Bahraini domestic politics that triggered allowed for King Hamad to legitimize 
violence against Bahraini citizens, centralize his rule, and target the Shia population. To this day 
King Hamad continues to exploit the link between the Shia population of Bahrain and Iran. Since 
2011 further governmental crackdown has continued to disenfranchise the Shia population.249 
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Currently, a prominent Shia cleric awaits trial for illegally instigating political change.250 The 
largest political group in Bahrain, a Shia political party, has been banned by the Bahraini 
government.251 Furthermore, the Interior Ministry continues to revoke the citizenship of many 
Shias with the aim of “protect[ing] the security and stability of Bahrain.”252 
Unresolved Controversy
 The continued relevance of Iran’s historical claims to territory in the Persian Gulf is 
apparent when looking beyond Bahrain to the islands of Abu Masa, Greater Tunbs, and Lesser 
Tunbs.  Whilst Iran did not have formal agreement allowing it to seize the islands of Greater and 
Lesser Tunbs in November 1971 the Shah had procured an agreement, known as the 
Memorandum of Understanding, with the Ruler of Sharjah to legally seize the northern half of 
the island of Abu Masa — the details of which are detailed in the prior chapter of this analysis. 
Yet, since 1971 when the settlement was ratified, the government of the United Arab Emirates 
protests that Iran has breached the terms of the agreement and that the Iranian government 
occupies parts of the island not allocated to it in the 1971 Memorandum of Understanding.253 
 The animosity of the government of the United Arab Emirates towards Iran concerning 
the island of Abu Masa is not entirely unwarranted. Following the signing of bi-lateral 
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agreements between Gulf states and outside powers in the early 1990s the Iranian government 
was increasingly concerned that the UAE might send foreign nationals to the island of Abu Masa 
—which it had increasingly been doing with Egyptians.254 It was soon affirmed by Iranian 
diplomats that all governmental representatives of the UAE had been expelled from Abu 
Masa.255 Those with citizenship from the UAE living on Abu Masa were forced to obtain Iranian 
documents to leave the island, and by August 1992 non-UAE citizens were being both expelled 
from the island and denied entry.256 As highlighted by one scholar of the dispute, once both 
educators and families were allowed to return to the island that November a state of normalcy 
resumed. However, “normal” in this context means lingering dispute over island sovereignty and 
persistence of aggressive rhetoric between the two states.
 Controversy has prevailed, and both Iran and the United Arab Emirates continue to 
quarrel over the current status of sovereignty of the tiny island. The visit of Iranian President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Abu Masa in April 2012 solicited multiple statements from both 
Abdullah bin Zayed, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the UAE, and officials from other Gulf states 
who condemned his “flagrant violation” of the UAE’s jurisdiction over the island.257 This stance 
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remains unchanged, and just six months ago bin Zayed expressed his anger over the hoisting of 
the Iranian flag over the part of Abu Masa adjudicated to the UAE.258
 Past attempts to garner a diplomatic solution between the two parties over the current 
state of sovereignty have failed. For both Iran and the UAE, the sovereignty of Abu Masa is a 
vexing issue despite the Memorandum of Understanding which was signed in 1971. There was 
no similar agreement reached regarding the Greater Tunbs and Lesser Tunbs islands, and thus 
from the moment troops arrived at the island Iran’s presence remains both controversial and 
contested. With declarations of animosity from the past few months there can be no disagreement 
that the islands remain central to current tensions between both Iran and the UAE.
The Islands: A Source of Iranian Nationalism  
 The Iranian government continues to contend that the islands of Abu Masa, Greater 
Tunbs, and Lesser Tunbs fall under the legal jurisdiction of the Iranian state. Beyond 
geographical value, the islands are an active source for nationalist rhetoric. During the 
presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad between 2005 and 2013 Iran’s nuclear program similarly 
served as a source of pride. During this time a columnist for Time Magazine in Tehran 
commented in an interview that:
a year ago [in 2005], there was no strong or collective opinion among 
young people on the nuclear issue. Today, it's a completely different 
atmosphere. Most young people, you know--secular, middle-class, 
traditional or otherwise--have been really convinced by the nationalist 
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rhetoric of the president, that this is a national right and, sort of see this as 
the cornerstone for Iran being strong in the region, and in the world.259
Iran became increasingly isolated both diplomatically and economically and it is within this 
context the nuclear program took on a sense of national significance. This is further evidenced by  
the issue of a new rial260 note with the image of electrons and an atom, and frequent national 
announcements regarding advancements in uranium enrichment.261 
 In 2006 the United Nations adopted Resolution 1969 to impose sanctions with the aim of 
deterring the development of Iran’s nuclear program. These sanctions, in addition to further 
sanctions enforced by the United States262 and the European Union, have had damaging 
ramifications beyond the energy sector and made it extremely difficult for Iran to conduct trade 
and commerce.263 As a result, multiple industries throughout Iran have collapsed264 and there 
remains little job security, few opportunities, and high unemployment.265 In 2012, it was reported 
that the automobile industry alone had directly or indirectly accounted for the layoffs of 2 million 
workers. Throughout the country families are suffering which is affirmed by further statistics: a 
survey conducted by the Central Bank of Iran concluded that in 2012, 22.5 per cent of Iranian 
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families had universal unemployment ― meaning all members of the family were unemployed.  
General standards of living have decreased as the government has been unable to profit off of its 
oil exports during sanctions, falling behind Iraqi production for the first time since the beginning 
of the Iran-Iraq war.266  It is with this backdrop that the territorial disputes over Abu Masa and 
the Tunbs become both a distraction from internal domestic problems, and a source for national 
pride.
 Through maintaining its claim to the islands in the Persian Gulf the Iranian government is 
affirming its position in the region. Some members of Iranian legislature have suggested that Iran 
formally declare Abu Masa and Iranian province, and other Iranian officials have suggested that 
the street where the embassy of the United Arab Emirates is located in Tehran be renamed Abu 
Masa.267 In similar fashion to the function of the Iranian nuclear program under Ahmadinejad, 
Abu Masa, Greater Tunbs, and Lesser Tunbs have been brought to the forefront of national 
discourse and exploited as a source for national sentiment.268 The dispute over the islands 
between Iran and the United Arab Emirates remains as controversial as ever with the situation 
today mirroring that which it was in 1971 where neither of the parties involved accepted each 
others claim to sovereignty and each maintained its own claim as righteous. What has changed 
however, is role of the islands in terms of Iranian identity.
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The Arab Islands 
 The controversial argument over the sovereignty of the three islands is not limited to 
discussions between Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Abdullah bin Zayed, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the UAE, remains vigilant in articulating his country’s disapproval of the 
Iranian occupation of all three islands on the international stage.269 He has repeatedly reiterated 
the desire of the UAE for the international community to resolve the dispute under the provision 
of international law, or through taking the case to the International Court of Justice.270 The 
renowned Iranian historian Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh has argued that in recent years the United 
Arab Emirates has aimed to both politicize and internationalize the island disputes in the Persian 
Gulf:
  Like the way the Arabs began to refer to the Palestinian lands occupied by 
  Israel as the “Occupied Arabic lands” in order to make the issue a cause
  celebre at the Arab World level, Abu Dhabi too has been referring to the
  islands of the Tunbs and Abu Musa as the “Occupied Arab Lands” in order 
  to turn the issue of its claims on these islands into a cause celebre at the 
  Middle East level as a symbol of Arab national resistance to the Iranian in-
  fluence in the Persian Gulf.271
This is seemingly not a new phenomena, for the islands have repeatedly been drawn into the 
discourse of other conflicts. Such is the case when examining the war which broke out in 1980 
between the newly-established Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq. Increasing border clashes and 
dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway led to the termination of their joint border agreement 
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and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein moved to station one third of Iraq’s forces on the Iranian 
border before invading the Islamic Republic in late September.272 One of the stipulations put 
forth by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein before Iraqi forces would withdraw from Iran was the 
“return to Arab sovereignty” of Abu Muasa, and the Tunbs.273 He did not mean for the islands to 
now by ruled by Ba’athist Iraq, but for a return of full authority of the islands to the United Arab 
Emirates. Hussein’s request was a supplemental clause to greater demands but the fact the 
islands were included show how the dispute has been intertwined with broader politics in the 
Persian Gulf. Iran’s presence on Abu Masa and the Tunbs for other states in the region has 
therefore taken on symbolism for Iran’s perceived to be expansionist aims — what one scholar 
once called Pax Iranica.274
 Such internationalization of the islands dispute is apparent when examining the 
diplomacy of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The importance of the islands beyond the United 
Arab Emirates is evidenced by the fact that during the 2006 GCC summit the issue of island 
sovereignty was written into the agenda for the meeting of Arab Gulf leaders. Furthermore, the 
press release of the summit detailed that all in attendance supported “the right of the State of the 
UAE to regain sovereignty over her three islands, which are the Greater and the Lesser Tunbs 
and Abu Musa, and over the territorial waters, the airspace, the continental shelf, and the 
economic zone of the three islands, as they are an integral part of the State of the United Arab 
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Emirates.”275 The controversy has also taken on a more international component, for the subject 
of the islands was featured in the statement of the GCC-EU Joint Council meeting in 2007. Thus, 
even beyond the Persian Gulf itself the territorial disputes remain intrinsic to Gulf affairs.276
  
Concluding Remarks
 This chapter began by evaluating the role of the historically rooted Iranian link to Bahrain 
in contemporary political discourse. Iranian officials continue to threaten to annex Bahrain and 
this rhetoric reaffirms that the Iran-Bahrain bond is not one of the past, but relevant to the 
present. The importance of the claim abandoned nearly 45 years ago is visible when examining 
the strategy employed by King Hamad of Bahrain, which I argue is intricately intertwined with 
the formally disposed Iranian claim. The alleged connection between Iran, the regional bastion of 
Shia Islam, and the Shia population of Bahrain continues to serve as justification for excessive 
use of governmental force and institutionalized discrimination.  The seizure of the Tunbs islands 
remains equally as relevant to contemporary affairs in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s occupation of the 
islands continues to dictate the temperature of the relationship between Iran and the United Arab 
Emirates, and have come to serve a new function as a source of nationalist pride.
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“No people can live in the past — not even its own past. But if 
it no longer has a link with its history, it must of necessity perish.”277
– Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
   Shah of Iran 
   1980
    
      Conclusion
 From January 1968 to March 1970 representatives from Iran, Bahrain, and the United 
Kingdom negotiated to reach a settlement relinquishing formal Iranian ties to Bahrain. Through 
utilizing the auspices of the United Nations the Iranian claim was disposed of, but additional 
territorial changes soon ensued in the Persian Gulf. In November 1971 Iranian forces landed on 
the northern half of Abu Masa, and both the Greater Tunbs and Lesser Tunbs islands. Whilst the 
Shah had garnered an agreement known as the Memorandum of Understanding to inhabit part of 
Abu Masa, no such resolve was reached in regards to the Tunbs. The status of Iran’s involvement 
regarding the three islands, and especially the Tunbs, remains subject to both controversy and 
contempt. Through contextualizing instances of diplomacy, I have sought to explore what it 
means for territory to be abandoned. In formulating a case in which Iran both abandoned and 
seized territory, a commentary on statecraft and sovereignty emerges which is able to lend itself 
towards further research of the Persian Gulf both past and present. 
 The first chapter of this analysis began by framing the relationship between Iran and the 
United Kingdom at the turn of the twentieth century. To illustrate common opposition to foreign 
activities in Iran I highlighted specific episodes of economic exploitation. This sentiment was 
exacerbated by the role of the American government in overthrowing the democratically elected 
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Prime Minister. Oral history projects and memoirs detailed how foreign governments support for 
the development of the Shah’s militarized police network, SAVAK, further amplified existing 
attitudes. With the British Prime Minister’s declaration to withdraw forces from the Persian Gulf 
the Shah sought to abandon the claim that was causing tension between him and his neighbors: 
the Iranian claim of sovereignty over Bahrain. To determine how the disposal of the claim was 
achieved hundreds of pages of diplomatic correspondence was read. In reconstructing the twenty 
six months of shuttle diplomacy the different phases of the negotiations, beginning with the Shah 
demanding a plebiscite and ending with an approach to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, were highlighted. Furthermore, the chronology put forth by other scholars was proven 
faulty and reworked to be true to the negotiations themselves. 
 The second chapter utilized a thematic approach to engage with the intricacies of the 
negotiations. I contend that throughout the duration of the deliberations both the Shah of Iran and 
the Emir of Bahrain were vehemently concerned with domestic politics. However, such 
obsession for public opinion was for completely opposing reasons. Whilst the Shah was 
engaging with domestic attitude towards Bahrain and the United Kingdom, the Emir of Bahrain 
sought to limit all possible expression of opinion, believing that the introduction of new 
legislative mechanisms into civil society might instigate both political and religious chaos. After 
evaluating attitudes towards religion, I maintain the abandonment of the Bahrain claim can not 
be separated from creation of a formal union of the smaller Gulf states now known as the United 
Arab Emirates. Lastly, I contend that throughout the negotiations the Shah was constrained by 
his concern for public opinion, but ultimately acted independently from his political advisers. 
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 Following the disposal of the formal Iranian claim to Bahrain, chapter three explores how 
Iranian troops occupied three other islands in the Persian Gulf: Abu Masa, Greater Tunbs, and 
Lesser Tunbs. Historiography of the event has entirely ignored that at one point a quid pro quo 
was an integral part of Britain’s negotiating strategy. Such an argument is further evidenced by 
retrospective references to a negotiated packaged settlement. However, it has been proven that 
British diplomatic officials rejected links between Bahrain and the other islands and were 
continuously advocating for negotiated with settlements with individual rulers of the islands. 
Therefore, there is simply not enough evidence to conclude that territorial changes in November 
1971 came as the result of a deal crafted between British and Iranian officials. 
 Whilst the Shah sought to abandon the Iranian states claim to formal claim to Bahrain it 
is not a thing of the past. Chapter four of this analysis began by evaluating the role of the 
historically rooted Iranian link to Bahrain in contemporary political discourse. Some in the 
Iranian political sphere continue to call for annexation to reunite the alleged province with Iran 
which reaffirms that the Iran-Bahrain bond is not one of the past, but relevant to the present. The 
importance of the formal claim abandoned nearly 45 years ago is visible when examining the 
strategies employed by King Hamad of Bahrain. The alleged connection between Iran, the 
regional bastion of Shia Islam,  and the Shia population of Bahrain continues to serve as 
justification for excessive use of governmental force and institutionalized discrimination. 
Similarly, the Abu Masa and the Tunbs remain a source of debate for the governments of Iran 
and the United Arab Emirates. Their contested sovereignty has been disputed on the international 
stage, and representatives of the UAE continue to call for the matter to be resolved through the 
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United Nations. Iran’s increased diplomatic and economic isolation in the recent years has also 
brought foreword the islands in terms of national consciousness.
 The case of the abandonment of the formal Iranian claim to Bahrain and subsequent 
seizure of islands in the Persian Gulf provides insight to how diplomatic results were garnered. 
Close evaluation reveals that there was no predetermined path from point A to point B. 
Generated outcomes were due to confronting challenges with persistence and compromise. The 
Shah’s commitment to abandoning the historically-rooted claim to Bahrain was not enough, but 
required considerable thought over methodology and specifics. As illustrated in this analysis 
there were multiple instances when negotiations could have come to a halt, or dramatically 
changed course. For instance, beginning in 1969 the Foreign Office attempted to broker 
individual deals between the Shah and the rulers of the Abu Masa and Tunbs islands which the 
Shah had made clear he desired. One notion put forth encompassed a three way trade in which 
the Sirri island would be awarded to Iran, Abu Masa to the Sharjah, and the Tunbs would be sold 
to Iran.278 Had such proposals been ratified the landscape of sovereignty in the Persian Gulf 
would vary from what presently exists. 
 An in-depth approach to these negotiations reveals the true nature of diplomacy in which 
statecraft was conducted, primarily, by rulers. The Shah of Iran and the Emir of Bahrain were 
most active in the discussions that brought about a joint approach to the United Nations. Whilst 
other high-level officials took meetings with representatives of the United Kingdom, the majority 
of the deliberations included the two monarchs themselves and not their foreign ministers or 
other spokesmen of the state. The Shah and Emir respectively navigated the challenges of 
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political decision making on their own. This point is further evidenced by the fact that more than 
one year into the deliberations regarding Bahrain the Iranian Ambassador to the United 
Kingdom, the party whom the Shah was negotiating with, did not know that the Shah had 
committed to dispose of the Iranian claim. 
 In examining what happens when territory is formally abandoned the cost of altering the 
state of territorial sovereignty becomes rapidly apparent. There were many ramifications to the 
disposal of the Iranian claim which have set the temperament for Iran’s relationship with its 
neighbors. At the time the negotiations were heralded by those involved as an instance of 
successful international diplomacy, but to date the connection between Iran and Bahrain, 
although formally relinquished, has caused immense tension for the two governments. Similarly, 
the subsequent move of Iranian forces to the coasts of Abu Masa, Greater Tunbs, and Lesser 
Tunbs in the autumn of 1971 continues to strain the relationship between Iran and the United 
Arab Emirates. A close reading of the history of the Persian Gulf illustrates how the past cannot 
be separated from the present, and is key to understanding the political climate of the region.
 The disposal of a territorial claim is not a phenomena unique to Iran, nor the Persian 
Gulf, nor the Middle East. When embraced in abstracts the research narrated in this thesis is of 
one state abandoning its ties to another territory in a broader period that saw the restructuring of 
maps, polities, and loyalties. The dramatic transformation of regional dynamics could be used to 
describe other recent historical events such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, and many of the 
territorial disputes that grace the headlines of newspapers each day. Historical conditions of the 
past will never completely mirror those of the present, but the insight drawn from this instance of 
diplomacy lends itself towards further comprehension of changing global dynamics.
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